Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

2013

The Uneasy Case against Copyright Trolls
Shyamkrishna Balganesh
Columbia Law School, sbalganesh@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case against Copyright Trolls, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 723 (2013).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/3149

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu, rwitt@law.columbia.edu.

ARTICLES
THE UNEASY CASE AGAINST
COPYRIGHT TROLLS
SHYAMKRISHNA BALGANESH*

ABSTRACT
The copyright troll and the phenomenon of copyright trolling have
thus far received surprisingly little attention in discussions of copyright law
and policy. A copyright troll refers to an entity that acquires a tailored
interest in a copyrighted work with the sole objective of enforcing claims
relating to that work against copiers in a zealous and dogmatic manner.
Not being a creator, distributor, performer, or indeed user of the protected
work, the copyright troll operates entirely in the market for copyright
claims. With specialized skills in monitoring and enforcing copyright
infringement, the troll is able to lower its litigation costs, enabling it to
bring claims against defendants that an ordinary copyright owner might
have chosen not to.
As a matter of law, the copyright troll’s model usually complies with
all of copyright’s formal rules. Courts have as a result struggled to find a
coherent legal basis on which to curb the copyright troll. In this Article, I
show that the real problem with the copyright troll originates in the
connection between copyright’s stated goal of incentivizing creativity and
the enforcement of copyright claims, which discussions of copyright law
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School. Many thanks to
Stephanos Bibas, Oren Bracha, Tom Cotter, Rochelle Dreyfuss, John Golden, James Grimmelman,
Mark Lemley, Irene Lu, Irina Manta, Chris Newman, Dotan Oliar, Gideon Parchomovsky, Joel
Reidenberg, Katherine Strandburg, Rebecca Tushnet, participants at the Fordham Law School Center
for Law and Information Policy Faculty Workshop, and the 2012 Stanford Intellectual Property
Scholars Conference for helpful comments and suggestions. Eric Lorber and Brian Ryoo provided
exceptional research assistance. All errors are mine.
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and policy fail to adequately capture. Copyright claims, much like other
private law claims, are systematically underenforced. This
underenforcement is neither purely fortuitous nor indeed marginal to the
system, but instead operates as an important safety valve that introduces an
informal breathing space into copyright’s functioning. Over time, this
underenforcement results in a balance between claims that are actionable
and enforced, and those that are actionable but tolerated. It is precisely
this balance that the advent of the troll disrupts, since it seeks to enforce
claims that copyright owners would have otherwise tolerated.
This Article unpacks the connection between the incentive to create
and the incentive to enforce in copyright to show why the troll’s actions are
indeed problematic, despite its formal compliance with copyright’s legal
rules. In so doing, this Article shows how the troll exploits the market for
copyright claims and argues that a permanent solution to the problem will
entail targeting the troll’s incentive structure rather than using any of
copyright’s existing doctrines.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The “troll” is becoming a familiar figure in the world of intellectual
property law. As an idea, it made its first appearance in patent law, where a
“patent troll” today refers to a nonperforming patent owner who merely
seeks to enjoin the use of an invention without itself using the invention or
servicing the market for it—the proverbial “dog in the manger.”1 Indeed,
during oral argument in a Supreme Court case involving the legal standard
for patent injunctions, one Justice seemed suitably amused by the term,
comparing it to a “scary thing” lying in wait for innocent victims under the
bridge.2
For all the attention that the troll has received in patent law however,
its presence in copyright law, together with the allied practice of copyright
trolling, has been largely ignored. References to “copyright trolls” in the
literature have in the past been few and far between.3 The idea began to get
a great deal of attention just this past year, when a Nevada-based company
by the name of Righthaven LLC (“Righthaven”) came to develop a
1. See, e.g., John M. Golden, Commentary, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 2111, 2112 (2007) (describing patent trolls as “a class of patent owners who do not provide end
products or services themselves, but who do demand royalties as a price for authorizing the work of
others”); Gerard N. Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation,
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1809, 1810 (2007) (discussing what makes a “patent troll”); Ronald J. Mann,
Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961, 1023 (2005) (same);
Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 458 (2012) (same); Ted Sichelman,
Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 368 (2010) (citing patent trolls as a transaction cost
that can “stifle commercialization”); James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll:
An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 192
(2006) (describing the characteristics of a “patent troll”); Marc Morgan, Comment, Stop Looking Under
the Bridge for Imaginary Creatures: A Comment Examining Who Really Deserves the Title Patent
Troll, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 165, 165 (2008) (same); Sannu K. Shrestha, Note, Trolls or Market-Makers? An
Empirical Analysis of Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 115 (2010) (same).
2. Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No.
05-130).
3. For some early usage of the term, see John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright
Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 537, 550 (2007) (“One can readily imagine a
future dystopian world where the record labels, long since irrelevant to the development and
distribution of new music, become nothing more than copyright trolls, drawing their revenue entirely
from collections [of licensing rights].”), and Lionel Bently, R. v The Author: From Death Penalty to
Community Service, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 11–12 (2008).
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business model that revolved around enforcing third party copyright claims
against infringers, claims in which it had no more than an artificially
tailored assignment of rights.4 In essence, Righthaven’s model was
premised on buying one of the creator’s several rights to exclude from the
bundle of exclusive rights that copyright law grants every creator and
enforcing it efficiently, albeit in dogmatic fashion.
Interestingly enough though, copyright law has long enabled behavior
that is only today pejoratively described as “trolling.” In enacting the
Copyright Act of 1976,5 Congress abandoned the long-held idea that
copyright’s set of exclusive rights, whenever granted to a creator, was
fundamentally indivisible. Under this old approach, copyright law was seen
as granting authors a limited set of exclusive entitlements. In assigning
these rights, authors could either assign them as a unified whole or not at
all.6 Any attempt to assign anything less than the whole was treated by the
law as a mere license, with the assignee / licensee then having no
independent standing to commence an action for infringement.7 This made
determining ownership of copyright a relatively simple matter and
precluded parties from tailoring their contractual arrangements in
excessively idiosyncratic terms. The Act of 1976, however, consciously
abandoned this approach by allowing the bundle to be broken up into as
many rights or mini-rights as the parties deemed necessary during an
assignment.8 Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, it went one step
further by creating an affirmative rule of standing, under which an
exclusive licensee or assignee of any right or mini-right was deemed to be
the owner of that right and given the ability to commence an action for
copyright infringement as long as it related to any right covered by the
contract.9 The Act thus came to recognize the idea of multiple ownership of
a single work and allowed each owner to hold a narrowly defined and
4. For Righthaven’s first lawsuit under its business model, see Complaint and Demand for Jury
Trial, Righthaven LLC v. Moneyreign, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-0350 (D. Nev. Mar. 13, 2010). For early
coverage of its strategy, see David Kravets, Newspaper Chain’s New Business Plan: Copyright Suits,
WIRED (July 22, 2010, 3:29 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/07/copyright-trolling-fordollars/.
5. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C.).
6. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.01[A] (rev. ed.
2012); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author Autonomy and Atomism in Copyright Law, 96 VA. L.
REV. 549, 564 (2010); Elliot Groffman, Comment, Divisibility of Copyright: Its Application and Effect,
19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 171, 171 (1979).
7. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 10.01[A], [C][1].
8. Id. § 10.02[A]; 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2) (2006).
9. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 10.02[B][1].
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limited set of rights.10
Analytically, this change seemed rather logical at the time. Since use
and exclusion are taken to be the two primary and interdependent features
of ownership, characterizing any party that holds both rights together as its
owner now made perfect sense.11 Yet, by allowing for the unrestricted
fragmentation of copyright’s bundle of exclusive rights and simultaneously
endowing it with independent practical significance (standing), the Act
allowed for a rather significant loophole on the enforcement front. In
situations where a copyright holder might want to sell its enforcement
rights (though not use rights) to another party, a practice otherwise
forbidden under traditional contract and common law rules prohibiting the
sale of legal claims,12 the parties could now create an exclusive license (or
assignment) that granted the licensee an artificially tailored use right, which
would in turn indirectly enable the licensee to commence an action for
infringement qua owner. Of course, this tailoring of the use right had to
overlap with the scope of the enforcement sought. But in situations in
which the target of the enforcement (the putative defendant) had already
been identified either individually or by class, this posed no problem. The
copyright holder could create an exclusive license that covered the precise
activities, time frame, and geographic area of the defendant, and the
licensee could enforce the copyright on its own, with claims for statutory
and willful damages. Thus emerged the potential for copyright trolls.
It was precisely this loophole that Righthaven crafted its entire
enterprise around, earning it the dubious distinction of becoming copyright
law’s first anointed “troll.” In less than two years, Righthaven managed to
bring more than 275 cases of copyright infringement against defendants,
settling many of these cases or succeeding in obtaining statutory damages
from courts.13 Its success in these actions in turn resulted in an outpouring
of criticism from different corners.14
10. Id. § 12.02; 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining “transfer of copyright ownership”).
11. For an elaborate discussion of the use-exclusion connection in property law, see J.E. PENNER,
THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 68 (1997).
12. See Walter Wheeler Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action, 29 HARV. L. REV. 816, 816
(1916); infra Part II. The prohibition is thought to emanate from the common law rules against
champerty and maintenance. For a recent overview of the prohibition, see Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim
Is this Anyway? Third Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1286–1301 (2011).
13. For a comprehensive list of these cases, see Comprehensive List of Copyright Infringement
Lawsuits
Filed
by
Righthaven,
LLC,
RIGHTHAVEN
LAWSUITS,
http://www.righthavenlawsuits.com/lawsuits.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2013) [hereinafter
Comprehensive List].
14. See, e.g., Susan Beck, “Copyright Troll” Righthaven Passes Early Federal Court Test, AM.
LAW. (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202471807253
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On the face of things though, it is not readily apparent why a
copyright owner’s delegation of the enforcement of its exclusionary rights
to another entity with special expertise in that task ought to be seen as
problematic. The delegation solves what economists call the principalagent problem by allowing for the perfect alignment of the agent’s
incentives with those of the principal, through the mechanism of divided
ownership.15 Additionally, the law’s historical reluctance to allow for the
free alienability of legal claims to third parties that are better positioned to
enforce them has long been thought to lack a suitably strong explanation.16
If a right is violated, and its enforcement is therefore the subject of a
perfectly valid legal claim, why should it matter exactly who commences
the legal action, as long as the original right-holder obtains some direct or
indirect benefit from the enforcement? Scholars have continued to make
this argument in response to the law’s prohibition on the alienation of legal
claims;17 and yet, when copyright law now seems to have indirectly
allowed for just such alienation, it is seen as deeply problematic. Despite
the voluminous media coverage that Righthaven’s activities as a troll
received, the precise legal, theoretical, or policy reasons for the purported
illegitimacy of its business model have received surprisingly little attention.
Indeed, much of the rhetoric surrounding Righthaven’s actions as a troll
seemed to stem from the perceived unfairness of today’s copyright laws,
around which its enforcement model was built.18
In this Article, I argue that the real reasons why allowing copyright
owners to outsource and delegate the enforcement of their rights to third
parties (trolls) such as Righthaven is troublesome originate in its disruption
&slreturn=20130313204837; Jay Fitzgerald, Legal Shark Sues Boston Bloggers, BOS. HERALD, Aug. 8,
2010, http://www.bostonherald.com/business/general/view/20100808legal_shark_sues_boston_
bloggers_las_vegas_paper_sells_news_content_to_lawyer; Joe Mullin, Is This the Birth of the
Copyright Troll?, LAW.COM (Aug. 16, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=
1202466627090&Is_This_the_Birth_of_the_Copyright_Troll; Debra Cassens Weiss, ‘Attack Dog’
Group Buys Newspaper Copyrights, Sues 86 Websites, AM. BAR. ASS’N J. (Aug. 4, 2010, 6:34 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/mobile/article/attack_dog_group_buys_newspaper_copyrights_sues_86_we
bsites.
15. For a general overview of the agency cost problem, see JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & DAVID
MARTIMORT, THE THEORY OF INCENTIVES: THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL 2–3 (2002).
16. See Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697, 703–57
(2005) (“[A]s traditionally formulated, the apparently most formidable objections to claim sales are not
powerful.”); Anthony J. Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61, 120–22 (2011) (“U.S.
courts have never been shy about admitting that the earliest justifications for limitations on assignment
and champerty has almost no relevance to contemporary life.”).
17. Sebok, supra note 16, at 132–33.
18. See, e.g., Beck, supra note 14; Fitzgerald, supra note 14; Mullin, supra note 14; Weiss, supra
note 14.
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of an enforcement equilibrium that is integral to the functioning of
copyright as an institution. While structured along the lines of a property
right, copyright law embodies a deep instrumentalism—relating to the
encouragement of creativity—that is manifested both in the working of its
individual doctrines as well as in the way in which these doctrines interact
with each other as an ensemble. Copyright law however consciously
chooses to realize this instrumental goal through the vehicle of private
enforcement, which explains why it is structured as a regime of private
law.19 And as with most regimes of private enforcement, realization of the
institution’s social goals depends on their alignment with the enforcement
incentives of private actors. Nonetheless, as has been shown to be true in
innumerable contexts, the enforcement incentives of private actors
invariably come to be influenced by various costs and considerations
external to the formal rules of the legal regime.20 The result is often a
systematic underenforcement of otherwise actionable claims. So it is with
copyright too, where this manifests itself in the creation of a balance
between actionable claims of infringement that are actually enforced and
actionable claims that are instead tolerated and treated as de facto
noninfringing claims.21
Copyright claims, much like other private law claims in the areas of
tort, property, and contract, are thus systematically underenforced.22 It is
19. See generally Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law:
Unbundling the Wrong of Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1664 (2012) (describing the private law origins
and structure of copyright law).
20. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Private Versus Social Costs in Bringing Suit, 15 J. LEGAL STUD.
371, 371 (1986) (“Recent work has analyzed the serious deficiencies of this system of private
enforcement that arise because the costs of operating the legal system create a divergence between
actual private incentives to sue and those that would lead to socially optimal results.”); Steven Shavell,
The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J.
LEGAL STUD. 575, 577–79 (1997) [hereinafter Shavell, Fundamental Divergence] (basing the argument
on the assumption that costs of litigation will affect private incentives to file suit); Steven Shavell, The
Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333,
333–34 (1982) [hereinafter Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive] (stating that the argument
can be made that multiple social efforts reflect the “problems of otherwise insufficient private motives
to bring suit”).
21. Tim Wu has used the phrase “tolerated use” to describe a set of uses (of copyrighted works)
that are “technically infringing” but “nonetheless tolerated.” Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 617, 617 (2008). With a few modifications, see infra Part III.B, “actionable but tolerated” uses
correspond roughly to Wu’s idea of uses that are tolerated by “policies of selective enforcement,” see
Wu, supra, at 622.
22. See Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1102–
03, 1158–59 (1996) (noting that tort law has high transaction costs and low claim rates); Michael J.
Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—And Why Not?,
140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1287 (1992) (“At nearly every stage, the tort litigation system operates to
diminish the likelihood that injurers will have to compensate their victims.”).
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this equilibrium of underenforcement that the advent of the copyright troll
threatens to disrupt. Being a complete outsider to the market for creative
works—in that it is not a producer, distributor, consumer, or indeed user of
such works—the troll operates on a fundamentally different calculus of
when to enforce the copyright claim from that of the original copyright
owners. In essence then, the troll’s actions convert copyright law’s
previously actionable but tolerated claims into actionable and enforced
ones, disrupting the implicit equilibrium.
The problem with the troll however is more than just that it is
overenforcing copyright. If this were the case, there would indeed be little
reason to distinguish the troll from any other overzealous copyright owner.
The unique problem presented by the troll originates in its incentive
structure. The traditional copyright owner’s decision whether to enforce an
actionable claim or not is thought to derive primarily (though not
exclusively) from copyright law’s fundamental purpose as an inducement
for creativity. Commencing an action for infringement is presumed to be a
viable option principally when the harm from such infringement interferes
in some way with (or is likely to interfere with) the market for creative
works.23 A copyright owner’s decision to sue a copier thus represents the
belief that the copying in question is harming the owner’s ability to exploit
the market for the copyrighted work. The incentive to enforce a copyright
claim is ordinarily thought to track—either directly or indirectly—the very
purpose for which the copyright system exists, namely, its creation of a
market-based inducement for creativity. What makes the troll’s disruption
of the underenforcement equilibrium problematic then is the fact that its
reasons for doing so bear no relationship whatsoever to the market for
creative works and derive instead from other unique efficiencies that it is
positioned to capitalize on. Its incentives to sue for copyright infringement
emanate from motivations that diverge rather fundamentally from the social
reasons for the very existence of the copyright system.
This is where things cease being straightforward. Copyright law’s
underenforcement equilibrium is maintained entirely through the conscious
inaction of copyright owners, with absolutely no support from copyright’s
formal rules and processes. In other words, it is almost never directly
enforced by courts, but is instead dependent entirely on potential plaintiffs’
behavior for its realization. “Actionable but tolerated” claims also fall well
outside the purview of the fair use doctrine, which by its very nature
23. Cf. Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive, supra note 20, at 337–38 (arguing that a
suit is socially desirable if social costs warrant the suit in that particular situation, not just when private
costs warrant the suit).
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extends to claims that copyright law recognizes as intrinsically
nonactionable to begin with.24 As a result, courts struggle to rein in
copyright trolls and invariably resort to rules and principles that are at best
indirect ways of addressing the problem. Given that copyright trolls have in
theory violated none of the law’s formal rules and principles, copyright law
has thus far failed to articulate a coherent basis on which to curb their
activities. In the process, the argument against copyright trolls starts
becoming somewhat murky, since it remains unsupported by legal doctrine
and instead originates in the overall functioning of the copyright system. It
is this sense of unease that the rhetoric about copyright trolls continues to
mask.
This Article sets out the analytical and normative contours of behavior
that is pejoratively described as “copyright trolling,” examines the
strategies that courts have used to curb it, and unbundles the real problems
underlying such behavior. In so doing, it shows why discussions of
copyright trolling reveal a sense of unease in their identification of the root
of the problem and solutions to it.
Part II starts with an overview of copyright trolling, using the
Righthaven episode as its paradigm. It sets out the idea of the “copyright
troll,” shows how copyright law’s principle of “infinite divisibility”
facilitated the creation of copyright trolls such as Righthaven, describes
Righthaven’s precise business model and enforcement strategy, and
concludes by examining how courts eventually reined in Righthaven’s
actions.
Part III unpacks the practice of copyright trolling to show how it
remains problematic as a matter of copyright theory and policy. This part
argues that copyright law embodies an equilibrium of underenforcement,
which emanates from its reliance on private enforcement to realize its
instrumental goals. It is this equilibrium that the troll’s behavior disrupts
both quantitatively and qualitatively. Since this equilibrium is maintained
entirely through private (in)action, the troll’s behavior remains perfectly
compatible with existing copyright law, thereby making the case against it
especially hard for both courts and litigants.
Part IV moves to the prescriptive and suggests that the only way to
completely disallow copyright trolling will require the formalization of a
rule that examines the incentives and motives of a claimant seeking
statutory damages in a copyright infringement action. It concludes by
24. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (describing an act of fair use as copying that “is not an infringement
of copyright”).
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suggesting an approach that courts might consider to this end.
II. THE COPYRIGHT TROLL
A copyright troll refers to an entity whose business revolves around
the systematic legal enforcement of copyrights in which it has acquired a
limited ownership interest. Much like a patent troll, a copyright troll is
generally a nonperforming entity, in the sense that it is not a creator,
distributor, or indeed user of creative expression.25 It operates by obtaining
an assignmentfor valuable consideration—of one or more legal rights in
another’s creative work, which it then uses to threaten and bring actions for
infringement against others. Focused almost entirely on the legal
enforcement of these rights, it relies either on the threat of litigation to
force a large monetary settlement or instead proceeds to litigate its rights
with the sole objective of obtaining damages from a defendant. Having no
interest in the use or exploitation of the work and dependent entirely on
settlements and damages for its revenue, a copyright troll is almost never
satisfied with an order merely enjoining the defendant’s infringing
activities.
Englishman Harry Wall is often described as the world’s first
copyright troll.26 The U.K. Dramatic Copyright Act of 1833 had created a
system of statutory penalties for the infringement of protected works.27
Wall developed a business in which he would obtain a power of attorney
from composers with the sole objective of enforcing their rights, and would
thereafter go around cities extracting hefty licensing fees and settlements
from individuals who performed these compositions, threatening them with
litigation and statutory penalties if they refused to pay up.28 A critic of Wall
described him as “not car[ing] anything for the work or anything else,” but
the “money” involved.29 This description of the copyright troll is as true
today as it was of Wall in the 1800s. The only difference is of course that
modern copyright trolls’ strategies are far more nuanced and sophisticated.
This part unpacks the working of copyright trolls as they operate today
25. See Jeremiah Chan & Matthew Fawcett, Footsteps of the Patent Troll, 10 INTELL. PROP. L.
BULL. 1, 1 (2005) (“[Patent trolls] obtain patents, not to make, use, or sell new products and
technologies, but solely to force third parties to purchase licenses.”).
26. Isabella Alexander, ‘Neither Bolt nor Chain, Iron Safe nor Private Watchman, Can Prevent
the Theft of Words’: The Birth of the Performing Right in Britain, in PRIVILEGE AND PROPERTY:
ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT 321, 339 (Ronan Deazley et al. eds., 2010).
27. The Dramatic Copyright Act, 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 15 (U.K.).
28. Alexander, supra note 26, at 339–40.
29. Id. at 339; Statement of Thomas Chappell Before the Royal Commission on Copyright of
1878, in ROYAL COMMISSION ON COPYRIGHT: MINUTES OF EVIDENCE 106–09 (1878).
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under the Copyright Act of 1976. Using the example of Righthaven, it
illustrates how trolls capitalize on the relaxed rules of assignment, standing,
and damages under copyright law, and then describes how courts have had
challenges dealing with them under existing law.
A. MOTIVATING THE COPYRIGHT TROLL
Each element of the copyright troll’s strategy inevitably involves
exploiting a loophole or feature of the law to its advantage. While each of
these loopholes may seem minor independently, when taken as a whole,
they collectively make for a robust business model. This section examines
the three main features of the Copyright Act of 1976, which when put
together, actively facilitate the emergence of copyright trolls. Indeed, in
some ways it is surprising that it took trolls a good three decades to fully
exploit these features and develop their business models.
1. Independent Standing to Sue
Under the Copyright Act of 1909, only the proprietor of a copyright
could bring an action for infringement, and only an author or the author’s
assignee was deemed a proprietor.30 A licensee, even if exclusive, could
bring an action only by joining the proprietor as a party to the action—
either voluntarily or involuntarily.31 This created an obvious problem for
potential trolls, since it necessitated either the copyright proprietor
cooperating with the troll (in a voluntary joinder) or the troll running the
risk of antagonizing the proprietor (in an involuntary joinder), which could
jeopardize its entire business. This limitation on standing thus created an
obvious obstacle to the emergence of trolls, and courts for their part,
enforced this limit in legitimately rigid fashion.32
30. Manning v. Miller Music Corp., 174 F. Supp. 192, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Borden v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 28 F. Supp. 330, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 12.02[A].
31. Followay Prods., Inc. v. Maurer, 603 F.2d 72, 74 (9th Cir. 1979); 3 NIMMER & NIMMER,
supra note 6, § 12.02[A].
32. See, e.g., Buck v. Elm Lodge, Inc., 83 F.2d 201, 202 (2d Cir. 1936) (“In the case at bar, the
society, as exclusive licensee of the right to perform the copyrighted work publicly for profit, could not
sue for infringement without joining the owner of the copyright.”); Goldwyn Pictures Corp. v. Howells
Sales Co., 282 F. 9, 11–12 (2d Cir. 1922) (reversing injunction placed on infringing film on the grounds
that the plaintiff “own[ed] less than the whole” copyright); Ed Brawley, Inc. v. Gaffney, 399 F. Supp.
115, 116 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (“It has been held repeatedly and consistently that a nonexclusive licensee
may not bring an action on a copyright infringement unless the licensor, the proprietor, of the copyright
is joined as a plaintiff.”); Field v. True Comics, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 611, 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (“A person
to whom has been transferred only a limited right is a mere licensee of the particular right, and, as such,
is not empowered to sue alone for violation of the copyright.”); Local Trademarks, Inc. v. Powers, 56 F.
Supp. 751, 752 (E.D. Pa. 1944) (granting motion to dismiss on grounds that the plaintiff was a mere
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The Act of 1976, however, altered this drastically, primarily in order
to give effect to its principle of unlimited divisibility, discussed below.
Under the new rules too, only the owner of a right granted by copyright
was permitted to bring an action for infringement.33 However, the
definition of an owner was altered to recognize exclusive licensees as
copyright owners as well.34 Nonexclusive licensees were still prohibited
from bringing actions.35 For trolls, this now meant that they would have to
do no more than obtain an exclusive license from a creator-owner to be
entitled to commence an action. They no longer had to make the licensor a
party to the action; indeed, under the new rules, the licensor (of an
exclusive license) was actively precluded from bringing an action.
On the face of things, the inclusion of exclusive licensees into the
category of owners made perfect sense. By itself, it continued to emphasize
the idea that exclusivity by its very nature implied the existence of no more
than one owner. It thus merely moved the ability to commence an action
from licensor to licensee in an exclusive transaction. The most pernicious
effects of this rule were however felt only when exercised in conjunction
with the Act’s allowance for the disaggregation of copyright’s bundle of
rights.
2. Copyright’s Disaggregative Bundle of Rights
The troll’s strongest impetus for its business model came from the
Act’s new rules on the divisibility of copyright’s exclusive rights. Whereas
the Act of 1909 had allowed copyright owners to either assign their rights
in the work in their entirety, or run the risk of assignments being treated as
mere licenses36—the 1976 Act now allowed for “[a]ny of the exclusive
rights comprised in a copyright, including any subdivision of any of the
licensee of copyright and not an assignee); Eliot v. Geare-Marston, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 301, 306–07 (E.D.
Pa. 1939) (detailing how one plaintiff was unable to recover damages because that plaintiff did not own
the full copyright and thus had no standing); Douglas v. Cunningham, 33 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 470 (D.
Mass. 1933) (granting motion to dismiss copyright infringement claim because the plaintiff was not the
owner of the entire copyright).
33. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 12.02[B].
34. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (defining “transfer of copyright ownership”).
35. See Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 32 (2d Cir. 1982); 3
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 12.02[B] (“Thus, a nonexclusive licensee has no more standing to
sue at present than was the case under the 1909 Act.”).
36. 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 10.01[A] (noting how the rule rendered it “impossible
to ‘assign’ anything less than the totality of rights commanded by copyright”). For cases treating a
partial assignment as a license, see Gardner v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774, 778 (9th Cir. 2002); P.C. Films
Corp. v. MGM/UA Home Video Inc., 138 F.3d 453, 456 (2d Cir. 1998); Hirshon v. United Artists
Corp., 243 F.2d 640, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1957); and Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 282 F. at 10.
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rights” to be “transferred” and “owned separately.”37 The owner of a
particular right was entitled to all the protections and remedies of the law as
it related to that right.38
Together with the new rules on standing, this changed things quite
significantly. First, it permitted the owner of an individual right to
commence an action for infringement of that particular right. And by
treating an exclusive licensee of a right as its owner, in effect it now
allowed the exclusive licensee of a specific right to bring an action for
infringement of that right.39 Second, and perhaps most importantly, the Act
expressly permitted both natural and artificial divisions of the bundle. Not
only could copyright’s set of six enumerated rights be partitioned during a
transfer, but parties were now free to create artificial subdivisions of them
as well. These subdivisions could be temporal, geographic, or relate to
particular markets for the work (for example, hardback editions rather than
paperback).40 In each instance, the ownership interest extended only to the
narrow subdivision specified in the grant, but that subdivision itself could
be tailored in as many idiosyncratic ways as possible.41
In essence then, copyright’s model of rights came to resemble what
property scholars have for long described as the “bundle of rights” picture
of property, under which property is thought to consist in an infinite set of
rights and privileges that relate to a particular resource.42 The exact content
of this bundle is impossible to ascertain in advance, but its depletion and
disaggregation can be determined analytically ex post. The content of the
bundle is thus only ever ascertained when it is broken down into its
constituent elements, and hence the term “disaggregative” to describe it.43
Notwithstanding the Act’s allowance for the infinite divisibility of the
bundle, it continued to emphasize an important restriction on this principle.
The divisibility could extend only to the rights specifically enumerated in
37. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(2).
38. Id.
39. See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 12.02[B][1].
40. Id. § 10.02[A] (discussing various temporal, geographic, and subject-matter divisions).
41. 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (noting how the interest extends only to the “particular right” owned);
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 61 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5674 (“Each of the five
enumerated rights may be subdivided indefinitely and . . . each subdivision of an exclusive right may be
owned and enforced separately.”).
42. For an authoritative study of the bundle of rights conception and its stranglehold on property
thinking, see generally J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711
(1996).
43. Id. at 734 (noting how under the disaggregative version, each “possible use” is itself treated
as a property right) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the Act’s grant.44 Thus, the mere “right to sue” or the “right to enforce” the
copyright could not on its own, be the subject of a transfer or assignment.
Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc. is the leading case on this
point.45 There, the plaintiff was the screenwriter for a television movie,
copyright in which was owned (through the work-for-hire doctrine) by the
producers.46 On discovering that the defendant’s work was substantially
similar to hers, the plaintiff obtained an assignment from the producers to
commence an action against the defendant. The transfer assigned to her “all
right, title and interest in and to any claims and causes of action against”
the defendants, as it related to the works in question.47 Hearing the appeal
en banc, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the list of copyright’s exclusive
rights contained in the Act was “exhaustive,” as a result of which the “bare
assignment” of the right to commence an action for enforcement of
copyright could not be validly assigned.48 The mere right to sue, in other
words, could not be validly assigned or licensed.
In light of the Act’s allowance for the infinite divisibility of its
enumerated rights however, this restriction on the alienability of the right to
sue is largely without teeth. Parties need merely create an artificially
constructed assignment that relates to a narrow part of the right being
infringed by the defendant, thereby effectively conferring on the assignee
the right to bring an action against the defendant. In Silvers, the plaintiff
would have thus needed to do no more than obtain a temporally
circumscribed assignment of the right to make a cinematographic
adaptation of the screenplay along the lines of the defendant’s movie.
Given the court’s insistence on complying with the formal language and
structure of the statute, this is likely to have passed muster with no
problems.49 Infinite divisibility—along multiple dimensions—thus enables
parties to create an artificial assignment that has the purpose and effect of
doing no more than transferring the mere right to commence an action for
infringement, a feature just waiting to be exploited by copyright trolls.
3. Statutory Damages
While the law’s relaxed rules on standing and divisibility certainly
44. See 3 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 12.02[B].
45. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 890 (9th Cir. 2005).
46. Id. at 883.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 886–87, 890.
49. The court placed extensive emphasis on the structure and language of the statute, and the
legislative history accompanying its enactment. See id. at 883–87.
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facilitate the troll’s existence, the real inducement for its actions come from
the Act’s rules on statutory damages, which render its business model not
just viable, but also potentially lucrative. The Copyright Act allows the
copyright owner in an infringement action to elect to receive “statutory
damages” instead of actual damages.50 While actual damages are usually
calculated on the basis of lost profits, statutory damages enable the court to
award the owner a fixed amount, per work infringed, as it “considers
just.”51 The statute further stipulates that this amount is to be between $750
and $30,000 per work, circumscribing a court’s discretion by fixing both
upper and lower limits for these damages.52 In addition, the Act also
empowers courts to raise the award to as much as $150,000 per work when
a plaintiff succeeds in establishing that the infringement was committed
willfully.53 Courts have in turn interpreted the requirement of willfulness
somewhat loosely, effectively converting the range of awards from $750 to
$150,000 per work infringed.54
Actual damages—compensatory in nature—make little sense for a
copyright troll. Having no presence in the actual market for expression,
whether as creator or distributor, it suffers no actual harm and loses no
profits as such from the infringement. Yet, by allowing a copyright owner
to elect to receive statutory damages that are in turn determined
independent of any harm, while simultaneously curbing a court’s ability to
lower the award below $750 per work, the Act effectively assures the troll
of a meaningful recovery once an infringement is established. In addition to
incentivizing the troll, the existence of such minimum mandatory statutory
damages also induces potential defendants to settle their claims with the
troll in advance of a court’s actual decision. Indeed, relying on statutorily
prescribed damages was integral even to Harry Wall, the world’s first
copyright troll.55
When originally introduced (in 1909), the idea behind statutory
damages was to enable courts to award damages in situations where it was
exceedingly difficult or impossible to determine actual damages or lost
profits.56 In situations where either actual damages or lost profits could
50. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006); 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 14.04[A].
51. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).
52. Id.
53. Id. § 504(c)(2).
54. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 14.04[B][3][a]; Pamela Samuelson & Tara
Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 439, 441 (2009).
55. Alexander, supra note 26, at 339.
56. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 54, at 449.
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indeed be proven, but were alleged to be inadequate (or in the nature of a
loss rather than a profit to the defendant), courts often refused to award
statutory damages.57 In contrast, under the 1976 Act, courts almost never
question a plaintiff’s preference for statutory damages over actual damages
and indeed often disregard the complete absence of any actual harm during
the computation—which obviously favors trolls.58
***
In summary then, these three features of the Copyright Act of 1976,
when combined together, create the ideal legal environment for the
emergence of copyright trolls. Having existed since 1976, it is indeed
somewhat surprising that it took nearly three decades for the first troll to
emerge. And unsurprisingly, when it did, courts and defendants had few
mechanisms with which to curb its activities.
B. THE CLAIM AGGREGATOR MODEL OF TROLLING: RIGHTHAVEN
It was not until a few years ago that entities began to recognize the
existence of a potentially lucrative business model hidden within the
contours of the Copyright Act. While the label of “copyright troll” has
come to be commonly attached to just about any entity that enforces
copyrights,59 it is crucial to bear in mind that a troll—as understood here—
is one whose entire business revolves around the acquisition and
enforcement of copyright in works created by others. A plaintiff-focused
group of lawyers, for instance, might actively solicit copyright owners and
assist them with the enforcement of their rights without actually acquiring
any rights themselves in those works.60 While it may be rhetorically
powerful to characterize these entities as trolls, the description is
analytically faulty since these entities never enter the copyright system
except in their capacities as lawyers. Never directly acquiring any claims,
57. Washingtonian Pub. Co. v. Pearson, 140 F.2d 465, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1944) (“Certainty that
profits and damages are nil is not equivalent to difficulty in proving them.”); F. A. Mills, Inc., v.
Standard Music Roll Co., 223 F. 849, 852 (D.N.J. 1915) (refusing to award statutory damages when the
defendant made no profits from the infringement). Nimmer characterizes these cases as situations where
“no injury” was established. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 14.04[F][1][a].
58. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 14.04[A].
59. See, e.g., Copyright Trolls, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.eff.org/issues/
copyright-trolls (last visited Feb. 18, 2013) (describing various copyright enforcement initiatives as
“trolls”).
60. The United States Copyright Group (“USCG”) is a prime example of this. The USCG
operates as a group of lawyers who approach various content owners offering to enforce their
copyrights against online distributors for them. Id. Unlike trolls, USCG does nothing to acquire any
ownership interest in the copyrights they actually enforce.
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their participation in the copyright system is entirely indirect, that is,
through the copyright owners whose claims they help enforce. The troll, by
contrast, in acquiring claims from others, is endowed with a crucial level of
autonomy in its decisionmaking. In other words, as owner of the acquired
claim, the troll decides on its own—based on its own set of incentives—
which particular claims to enforce and against whom to so enforce them. Its
enforcement calculus is thus effectively its own, which is not the case with
entities merely assisting copyright owners with enforcement. Nonetheless,
some of the concerns with copyright trolls do carry over to these entities as
well.
Commencing its operations in early 2010, Righthaven was perhaps the
first entity to capitalize on copyright law’s lax rules on standing,
assignment, and damages. This section begins by describing Righthaven’s
business model and revenue-earning strategy, then looks at how courts and
defendants addressed the question of fair use when dealing with
Righthaven, and finally examines the strategy that courts and defendants
eventually used to curb Righthaven’s activities.
1. Copyright Revenues in Four Simple Steps
Describing itself as committed to “advancing the interests of copyright
law,” Righthaven’s business model was premised on finding copyright
owners who in principle wanted their rights enforced, but lacked the time,
expertise, or willingness to do so themselves, or indeed the resources to
hire outside lawyers for this task each time.61 Righthaven presented these
owners with a third, more economically viable option: the transfer of a
limited ownership interest in the content to Righthaven in order to enable it
to enforce these rights against third parties using its own resources and
expertise.
Locating a Creator: The first step of its strategy involved locating a
copyright owner willing to enter into a strategic partnership with it.
Stephens Media LLC (“Stephens Media”), the owner of over seventy large
newspapers across nine states, soon became its first partner.62 Both parties
61. See Dan Frosch, Enforcing Copyrights, for a Profit, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2011, at B1
(quoting Steve Gibson, CEO of Righthaven LLC, and discussing how some newspapers have formed
business relationships with Righthaven after “grappl[ing] with how to protect their online content”),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/03/business/media/03righthaven.html?pagewanted=
1&_r=1.
62. David Kravets, Righthaven Expands Troll Operation with Newspaper Giant, WIRED (Dec. 7,
2010, 4:36 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/12/righthaven-expands-trolling/; Kravets,
supra note 4.
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entered into a “Strategic Alliance Agreement,” under which Stephens
Media agreed to assign its rights in works that were copied by potential
defendants to Righthaven for enforcement in court, and both parties also
agreed to share the proceeds of any enforcement on a proportional basis.63
This agreement also made explicit the artificial nature of the future
assignments providing in no uncertain terms that Righthaven had no right
or entitlement to exploit works or participate in their exploitation other than
the right to recover any proceeds in an infringement action.64
Finding a Copier: Having found a willing copyright owner, step two
began with Righthaven policing the Internet and other publication media
for unauthorized uses of Stephens Media’s works. Once it located an
unauthorized use of a work—usually in the nature of a blog reproduction of
text or photographs from a newspaper owned by Stephens Media—
Righthaven would then obtain an assignment of the specific work (or part
of it) being reproduced from Stephens Media.65 In addition to covering
only the work being copied, the assignment was also invariably
retrospective in operation, allowing Righthaven to seek redress for “past,
present, and future” infringements of the work.66
Commencing the Action: In step three, Righthaven would bring an
action for copyright infringement against the identified user of the work in
federal court. Since most of its actions involved online reproductions that
could be accessed anywhere, it chose the federal district courts of Nevada
and Colorado for its actions.67 Typically, a copyright owner places at least
some (even if not a large) value on getting the defendant to stop its
infringing activities and to this end ordinarily sends the defendant a “ceaseand-desist” letter that first threatens legal action before actually bringing it.
To Righthaven, a troll, curbing the defendant’s actions through such threats
mattered very little. It therefore, in all but a very few of its cases, proceeded
to commence an action against a defendant with absolutely no
63. Declaration of Laurence F. Pulgram in Support of Defendants’ Supplemental
Mememorandum Addressing Recently Produced Evidence Relating to Pending Motions, Exhibit A at
3–4, Righthaven LLC v. Democratic Underground, LLC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 968 (D. Nev. 2011) (No.
2:10-cv-01356-RLH (GWF)), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/53175589/Strategic-AllianceAgreement-Between-Righthaven-and-Stephens-Media.
64. Id. at 4.
65. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter
Jurisdiction and Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, Exhibit 1 at 2, Righthaven LLC v. Dr. Shezad Malik
Law Firm P.C., No. 10-cv-00636-RLH-RJJ (D. Nev. dismissed Nov. 1, 2010), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/36862835/Righthaven-Copyright-Assignment.
66. Id.
67. For a complete listing of its lawsuits, see Comprehensive List, supra note 13.
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forewarning.68 And unlike the typical copyright owner, its primary focus in
these actions was on obtaining an award of statutory damages, going as
high as $150,000 per work when the infringement was alleged to be willful.
Settling the Claim: In a large number of cases brought by Righthaven,
the defendant simply chose not to litigate the claim, but to instead settle
with Righthaven for a figure significantly lower than the maximum
statutory damages it might have been required to pay if the matter had
actually proceeded to trial.69 These settlements have averaged around
$3500 per defendant.70 Righthaven’s collection strategy thus involved
playing into potential defendants’ litigation and risk aversion. The
collection strategy offered defendants the chance to settle for a lower (but
nonnegligible) amount instead of having to risk a higher award and incur
additional transaction costs in court. While the settlements may not have
been independently lucrative, cumulatively they amounted to a lot given
that Righthaven commenced over 275 cases of infringement.71
2. The Irrelevance of Fair Use in Theory
Righthaven’s principal targets were individuals and groups that had
posted copyrighted content on their websites or blogs without
authorization. Very often, this involved more than just posting excerpts
from the original articles and frequently entailed the verbatim reproduction
of articles in their entirety. At first blush, it might seem like the fair use
doctrine—copyright law’s primary safety valve—might have rendered
these actions noninfringing. In reality however, the fair use doctrine was of
little help to these defendants.
Only ever rarely do courts find a defendant’s verbatim reproduction of
a copyrighted work in its entirety to be a fair use. Merely because the use is
for an informational purpose as opposed to a commercial purpose
ordinarily does not render it a fair use under existing copyright law.
Righthaven’s strategy relied entirely on this position and was well
supported by prior cases in which bloggers had been found liable for
posting content to their websites despite the noncommercial and
68. E.g., Kravets, supra note 4 (discussing how Righthaven brought an infringement suit prior to
sending the defendant a takedown notice).
69. Id.
70. See Steve Green, Righthaven Settles $150,000 Copyright Suit for $1,000, VEGAS INC. (July 1,
2011, 1:55 AM), http://www.vegasinc.com/news/2011/jul/01/righthaven-settles-150000-copyright-suit1000/ (discussing three of Righthaven’s publicly reported settlement figures).
71. See Comprehensive List, supra note 13.
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informational nature of their activities.72 Even though courts have observed
that there may be instances where the reproduction of a work in its entirety
can amount to a fair use, they have generally been reluctant to declare
instances of simple verbatim reproduction as fair use.73 In hardly any case
in which a defendant has reproduced a creative work in its entirety and
without any significant transformation to it (for example, by way of
commentary or criticism being added, or by giving the work a new
purpose), has a court found the copying to be fair use.74 Thus, existing fair
use jurisprudence seemed to favor Righthaven.
Nonetheless, when they realized their inability to curb Righthaven
under other principles, a few courts—desperate for a solution and finding
none (see below)—began to interpret fair use in extremely liberal terms.
These courts effectively exempted conduct that would have been
considered infringement in relation to any other plaintiff.75 Relying on
dicta that verbatim copying too could be fair use under circumstances,
these courts placed significant weight on the noncommercial nature of the
defendants’ activities76 and the lack of potential market harm to the owner
as part of the fair use analysis.77 While this approach was limited to a few
courts, it nonetheless made other copyright owners—that is, true creators
and distributors—concerned about the expansive precedent being set.78
This approach to the fair use doctrine ultimately failed to gain significant
popularity given that courts and defendants in due course found another
way to restrict Righthaven.
Lastly, something must be said for the fair use doctrine’s inherent
ambiguity and Righthaven’s reliance on this uncertainty to take advantage
of potential defendants’ risk aversion. Structured as a common law-type
four-factor inquiry, the fair use doctrine has long been criticized for
72. See, e.g., L.A. Times v. Free Republic, No. CV 98-7840 MMM (AJWx), 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5669, at *6, *50–51, *75–76 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2000).
73. 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 10:143 (2012).
74. See id.
75. E.g., Righthaven, LLC v. Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1147–51 (D. Nev. 2011);
Righthaven LLC v. Realty One Grp., Inc., No. 2:10-cv-1036-LRH-PAL, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
111576, at *4–6 (D. Nev. Oct. 18, 2010); Righthaven LLC v. Klerks, No. 2:10-cv-00741-GMN-LRL,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105307, at *6–10 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2010) (finding a sufficient meritorious fair
use defense to set aside a default).
76. E.g., Klerks, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105307, at *7–8.
77. E.g., Realty One Grp., Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111576, at *5–6.
78. See David Kravets, Righthaven Loss: Judge Rules Reposting Entire Article Is Fair Use,
WIRED (June 20, 2011, 4:54 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/06/fair-use-defense/ (noting
how Righthaven plans to appeal the decision and that it is “not often that republishing an entire work
without permission is deemed fair use”).
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offering potential defendants very little guidance in terms of their liability
for copyright infringement.79 This uncertainty is thought to result in a
heightened amount of risk aversion among copiers, who prefer to either
license, settle, or worse still, refrain from using altogether the protected
work in order to avoid time- and cost-intensive litigation.80 While neither
the uncertainty nor the risk aversion is in any sense Righthaven’s creation,
its strategy nonetheless drew obvious support from both features. The fair
use doctrine, in short, was both useless to Righthaven’s defendants and
structurally facilitative of Righthaven’s strategy.
3. Reining in the Troll
While Righthaven enjoyed a good deal of success in its early actions,
with time courts began to grow wary of its business model and litigation
strategy, especially in light of the extensive criticism it began receiving. It
was not until recently, however, that courts found a way by which to fault
Righthaven for its model. During the course of its most recent suits against
online copiers, it was discovered that the agreement between Righthaven
and Stephens Media contained language that seemed to convey to
Righthaven no more than the mere right to sue, which as discussed earlier,
would have been ineffective at enabling Righthaven to bring its actions.81
In Righthaven LLC v. Democratic Underground LLC,82 a district court
in Nevada concluded that any actual assignment of copyright that
Righthaven received from Stephens Media had to be understood and
interpreted in light of the parties’ “Strategic Alliance Agreement” that they
had entered into at the very beginning.83 The agreement provided in
explicit terms that despite any assignment to Righthaven, Stephens Media
was to retain the “exclusive license” to exploit the works in all forms, and
that Righthaven was to have no rights other than the rights to recover from
infringers.84 Relying on Silvers, the district court concluded that in light of
this agreement, Righthaven’s eventual assignment left it with “nothing
more than a fabrication.”85 Describing Righthaven’s claims to the contrary
79. Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483,
1495–1502 (2007).
80. Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1271, 1284–
91 (2008); James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE
L.J. 882, 887–906 (2007).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 45–48.
82. Righthaven LLC v. Democratic Underground LLC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 968 (D. Nev. 2011).
83. Id. at 972–73.
84. Id. at 972.
85. Id. at 973 (“In reality, Righthaven actually left the transaction with nothing more than a
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as “disingenuous” and potentially “deceitful,” the court dismissed
Righthaven’s suit, finding that it had no standing whatsoever to sue for
copyright infringement.86 On learning about the strategic agreement,
several other courts also either dismissed or stayed most of Righthaven’s
remaining suits, in rather quick succession.87
While the court may have been right in its interpretation of the
agreement, its solution was entirely temporary. All that Righthaven needed
to do to fix it and obtain legitimate standing for the future, was to modify
the strategic agreement to convert the exclusive license retained by its
client into a nonexclusive one and obtain exploitation rights to the work as
well. In other words, the court had found a procedural flaw in Righthaven’s
exploitation of a substantive loophole in the law. The former could be
fixed, but not the second. Surely enough, Righthaven and Stephens Media
modified their agreement along precisely these lines, thereby effectively
remedying the lack of standing for future cases.88 In cases in which
Righthaven had filed its complaint prior to the amendment however, courts
refused to use the amendment to interpret the original agreement and
continued to dismiss such cases for lack of standing.89
Recognizing the futility of curbing Righthaven’s practices exclusively
through copyright law, its opponents began looking elsewhere. Shortly
after the dismissals, a group known as the Citizens Against Litigation
Abuse (“CALA”) filed a petition in the Supreme Court of South Carolina
arguing that Righthaven’s business model amounted to an “unauthorized
practice of law,” since Righthaven was not, strictly speaking, a “law
fabrication since a copyright owner cannot assign a bare right to sue after Silvers.”).
86. Id. at 973, 976.
87. Righthaven LLC v. Barham, No. 2:10-cv-02150-RLH-PAL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66720,
at *3–4 (D. Nev. June 22, 2011); Righthaven, LLC v. DiBiase, No. 2:10-cv-01343-RLH-PAL, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67181, at *3–4 (D. Nev. June 22, 2011); Righthaven, LLC v. Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d
1138, 1147. On appeal in two of these cases, the Ninth Circuit affirmed and validated the lower courts’
interpretation of the Strategic Alliance Agreement, and concluded that Righthaven lacked standing to
commence an action for copyright infringement. Righthaven LLC v. Hoehn (Hoehn II), 716 F.3d 1166,
1169–72 (9th Cir. 2013).
88. David Kravets, Righthaven Says It Owns News Articles It’s Suing Over—for Real This Time,
WIRED (June 24, 2011, 2:52 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/06/righthaven-survival-bid/
(describing the amendment to the agreement).
89. See, e.g., Righthaven, LLC v. Mostofi, No. 2:10-CV-1066-KJD-GWF, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 75810, at *9–10, *13 (D. Nev. July 13, 2011) (“Here, Plaintiff and Stephens Media attempt to
impermissibly amend the facts to manufacture standing. Therefore, the Court shall not consider the
amended language of the SAA, but the actual assignment and language of the SAA as it existed at the
time the complaint was filed.”); Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 1147 (“Even assuming that the [amendment]
can change the jurisdictional facts as they existed at the time of the filing of the suit, it still does not
correct the deficiencies with respect to lack of standing.”). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower courts’
refusal to interpret the original agreement in light of the amendment. Hoehn II, 716 F.3d at 1171–72.
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firm.”90 In essence, the petition alleged that Righthaven was engaged in
champerty and maintenance, practices long forbidden by the common law,
in an effort to avoid third party encouragement for litigation.91 What is
most intriguing about the petition, however, is that the core of the argument
faulted Righthaven for its unethical as opposed to unlawful conduct.
Describing it as “overreaching,” “bullying,” and “viciously attack[ing]”
defendants, the petition seemed more intent on characterizing Righthaven’s
actions as amounting to an unfair and unethical business model, rather than
as a direct violation of any legal rule.92
In due course however, Righthaven’s model began to fall apart.
Shortly after courts began finding that it lacked standing to sue, Righthaven
stopped commencing new cases and began laying off employees.93 In cases
in which the court concluded that it had lacked standing to bring its suits all
along and had thereby misled the court, Righthaven was fined and
sanctioned for its actions, and ordered to pay its opponents’ full costs and
reasonable attorney’s fees.94 When Righthaven failed to comply, the court
ordered its assets to be seized and auctioned.95 Righthaven’s assets and
domain name were then placed in receivership—and Righthaven
effectively went under.96
What Righthaven’s short-lived adventures reveal more than anything
is the somewhat shaky legal foundation on which the case against copyright
trolling—Righthaven’s principal activity—was built. In the end,
Righthaven’s lack of standing hinged on an inadequacy in its agreement
with Stephens Media, rather than a clear principle, theory, or doctrine.
Arguments altogether missed the fact that Righthaven’s actions were
90. Petition for Original Jurisdiction at 4, Citizens Against Litig. Abuse, Inc. v. Righthaven LLC,
(S.C. June 29, 2011), available at http://bloglawblog.com/docs/CALA_v_Righthaven_Supreme_
Court_Petition.pdf; Steve Green, Two Groups Ask High Court to Shut Down Righthaven in
South Carolina, VEGAS INC. (June 27, 2011, 4:20 PM), http://www.vegasinc.com/news/2011/
jun/27/two-groups-ask-high-court-shut-down-righthaven-sou/.
91. Petition for Original Jurisdiction, supra note 90, at 9–21.
92. Id. at 25–28.
93. David Kravets, Copyright Troll Righthaven Goes on Life Support, WIRED (Sep. 7, 2011,
12:59 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/09/righthaven-on-life-support/.
94. Righthaven LLC v. DiBiase, No. 2:10-cv-01343-RLH-PAL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124127,
at *2–3 (D. Nev. Oct. 26, 2011); Righthaven LLC v. Wolf, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1273 (D. Colo. 2011).
95. Steve Green, Marshals Ordered to Seize Righthaven Assets, VEGAS INC. (Nov. 1, 2011, 7:54
PM), http://www.vegasinc.com/news/2011/nov/01/marshals-ordered-seize-righthaven-assets/.
96. Steve Green, Can Righthaven Survive Latest Legal Blow, LAS VEGAS SUN (Dec. 13, 2011,
2:00 AM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2011/dec/13/can-righthaven-survive-latest-legal-blow/;
Steve Green, With Sale of Domain Name, Tables Are Turned on Righthaven, VEGAS INC. (Jan. 6, 2012,
1:45
PM),
http://www.vegasinc.com/news/2012/jan/06/sale-domain-name-tables-are-turnedrighthaven/.
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fundamentally problematic as a matter of copyright theory and policy.
III. THE PROBLEM WITH COPYRIGHT TROLLS
In the end, courts were able to rein in Righthaven’s business model on
the ground that it lacked standing since it had purportedly been given no
more than the mere right to sue, which was insufficient to confer standing
under the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Silvers.97 District courts that invoked
Silvers interpreted it as suggesting that an actionable claim for copyright
infringement could not be alienated independent of some real right to use
and exploit the work.98 Using this reasoning, the troll was thus faulted for
attempting to trade in an independent market for copyright claims. Besides
being unduly formalistic and therefore likely short-lived, this approach to
regulating copyright trolling remains extremely myopic, missing some of
the obvious benefits in allowing copyright claims to be traded. Not only
does it misidentify the problem with copyright trolling, which is likely to
undermine its effectiveness, but it also turns a blind eye to some of the
benefits of third-party involvement in litigation funding, a practice that has
started to gain significant momentum in numerous other areas.99
The problem with copyright trolls, however, has little to do with the
free alienability of actionable copyright claims. It originates instead in
ideas that are fundamental to the existence and justification of the copyright
system. Copyright law contains an enforcement optimality / equilibrium
that originates in its structure as a private law mechanism. This equilibrium
is very closely connected to copyright law’s fundamental social purpose—
namely, the inducement of creativity. The troll’s activities disrupt this
equilibrium, but in so doing also run counter to copyright law’s basic goal,
which is why its actions are seen as deeply problematic.
Part III.A unbundles the connection between copyright law’s overall
purpose and its private enforcement mechanism. Part III.B argues that this
connection produces a hidden enforcement equilibrium between different
types of copyright claims. Parts III.C and III.D then describe the way in
97. Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 890 (9th Cir. 2005).
98. See, e.g., Righthaven LLC v. Democratic Underground, LLC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 968, 972–73
(D. Nev. 2011).
99. For recent work documenting this trend, see Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A
Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65, 92–101 (2010), and Maya Steinitz, Whose
Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1275–85 (2011). For
coverage in the popular media, see Binyamin Appelbaum, Investors Put Money on Lawsuits to Get
Payouts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2010, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/15/business/
15lawsuit.html?pagewanted=all. For recent work extending this analysis to copyright law, see
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright Infringement Markets, 113 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
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which a troll’s actions are disruptive of both the equilibrium and the goals
of copyright law.
A. THE PRESUMPTIVE ALIGNMENT OF THE INCENTIVES TO CREATE AND
LITIGATE
As a fundamentally utilitarian institution, copyright’s basic purpose is
thought to lie in providing creators with a market-based inducement to
create.100 Through its grant of a set of exclusive rights in a work of original
expression, copyright law is thought to incentivize the very production of
that expression.101 Justice Blackmun put it best when he unequivocally
emphasized that “[c]opyright is based on the belief that by granting authors
the exclusive rights to reproduce their works, they are given an incentive to
create.”102 Thus, the public welfare, manifested in the progress of the
sciences and useful arts, is believed to be promoted by granting individual
creators limited entitlements in their creations.103 This idea, often referred
to as copyright’s incentives theory, is today taken to be the central dogma
of U.S. copyright law. It routinely informs legislative activity in the area,
and indeed motivates courts’ analyses and interpretation of copyright
doctrine.104
Put in simple incentive-based cost-benefit terms, copyright’s logic of
incentives posits that creators are induced to produce creative expression
because the benefits that they are likely to obtain from its grant of exclusive
rights outweigh the costs incurred in the creative process.105 As rational
actors, creators are thus motivated to create by this cost-benefit calculus,
thereby enhancing overall social welfare. If B© represents the benefits
likely to accrue to a creator from copyright (determined ex ante, at the time
100. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1569,
1577 (2009); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 428 (2002);
Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1197 (1996). See also
Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA L. REV. 775, 797 (2003) (hinting at the significance of
incentives in copyright jurisprudence).
101. Balganesh, supra note 100, at 1577; Liu, supra note 100, at 428; Sterk, supra note 100, at
1197.
102. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 477 (1984) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
103. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
104. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
105. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 38–39 (2003) [hereinafter LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE]; William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 325, 327 (1989) (“For a new work to be created, the expected return—typically, and we
shall assume exclusively, from the sale of copies—must exceed the expected cost.”).
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of creation), and CC represents the costs involved in the creative process,
the copyright system is premised on the idea that B© must be greater than
CC to generate the incentive to create.
Beyond simply identifying the fact that copyright confers likely
benefits on creators, the incentives theory pays little attention to the precise
contours of those benefits and the ways in which their likelihood figures in
creators’ calculations—assuming, of course, that the basic idea underlying
the incentives theory holds true.106 Copyright certainly does not promise
creators a viable market for their works. Works protected by copyright
routinely fail in the marketplace, producing no tangible benefits to their
creators. Yet, this is hardly copyright’s fault. On the other hand, what
copyright promises to creators is best described as an assurance of market
preservation—that is, the assurance that it will protect the creator’s market
through its entitlement structure, regardless of how economically viable
that market turns out to be. If market preservation forms the core of
copyright’s promise to creators, much of its incentive then originates in the
precise mechanism of preservation that it offers. Copyright law’s basic
mechanism of market preservation remains its conferral of exclusive rights
to copy the work, on creators. In granting creators exclusive rights in their
works, it assures them that they alone will be able to exploit the market for
copies of their works, however large or small that market may be.
However, since expression is by its nature nonrivalrous, the functional
significance of these exclusive rights emanates in large measure from the
correlative duty that they impose on nonowners not to copy the work.107
This point is best illustrated by a hypothetical.
Consider an open area scattered with edible apples on the ground. In
order to induce individuals to make effective use of these apples (and clean
up the ground), assume that the law now creates a rule under which a
person who expends effort to pick up an apple obtains the exclusive right to
the apple. In this situation, a person who picks up an apple from the ground
comes to be in de facto exclusive possession of it. Even though the act of
picking it up imposes a duty on others to stay away from that apple once
picked up, the functional value / significance of the exclusive right does not
depend entirely on the duty for its functioning. The holder of the apple can
simply take a bite of the apple after picking it up without having to assert
any rights over it. Copyright law works almost exactly like this regime,
106. But see generally Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just
Imagine That?, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 29 (2011) (expressing skepticism about copyright’s
fundamental theory of incentives).
107. Balganesh, supra note 19, at 1667–74.
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except that the apple is replaced with a nonrival resource—namely, original
expression. Once creators expend effort to produce original expression,
they obtain an exclusive right to copy it. Since the expression is incapable
of being possessed exclusively, the exclusive right is, however, only ever
realized by disabling others from performing acts over which the owner is
granted an exclusive right over, such as copying. This disabling dimension
emanates from the duty that copyright law imposes on nonowners.108
Copyright’s incentive structure—its market-preserving exclusiverights framework—is therefore heavily dependent on creating a correlative
duty on others and then maintaining and enforcing breaches of this duty.
Enforcing breaches of this duty, either directly through the law or in the
shadow of the law, remains integral to the benefits of the exclusive rights
that copyright law confers on creators. Yet, analyses of the benefits likely
to flow from the copyright entitlement rarely ever look to the contingencies
of enforcement, which obviously entails its own set of costs.109 To put the
point more sharply, if a creator were granted an exclusive rights
entitlement, but nonetheless realized that the enforcement of that
entitlement was likely to be cost prohibitive and unviable, it would feed
directly into the entitlement’s ability to induce creative expression.
Assume a movie studio (the creator), ABC Inc., is determining
whether to create a movie. It recognizes that the cost of making a motion
picture is $2.5 million, but that it is likely to make at least $4 million in
revenues through theatres and other forms of distribution. Now assume that
ABC Inc. also recognizes that rampant copying of the movie on the Internet
and by competitors is likely to diminish its revenues from the movie to zero
by interfering with the public’s interest in going to movie theatres or in
buying legal copies of the movie. The theory of incentives tells us that by
promising creators like ABC Inc. that they have exclusive rights to make
copies of their creation, copyright law enables them to exploit the full
market potential of their works, effectively preserving their incentive to
create. In our case, copyright therefore promises ABC Inc. that it will
preserve its ability to earn revenue from its movie by rendering
unauthorized copying actionable, and ABC Inc. estimates based on this
promise that it can thereby obtain a net gain of $1.5 million. Copyright
certainty does not promise ABC Inc. that it will actually earn $4 million,
just that it will preserve ABC Inc.’s ability to do so by disabling
unauthorized copying. Copyright is in effect preserving the entirety of ABC
108. Id.
109. See generally Kaplow, supra note 20 (identifying and discussing the different costs that
private litigation entails, some of which are borne by the private actor, and others by society).
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Inc.’s market, meaning that in this case B© ($4 million) > CC ($2.5 million),
motivating ABC Inc. to make the movie.
Now, ABC Inc. may also realize that copyright law’s mechanism of
preservation, its promise of exclusivity, is heavily dependent on ABC Inc.’s
being able to enforce the exclusive rights that it grants creators. Here, if
enforcing copyright law to make sure that its revenues stay at $4 million
(and preserve the market in its entirety) will likely take another $1.5
million, ABC Inc. will have no incentive to create the movie, since it can
calculate that its net gain will be zero. This suggests that the effective
functioning of copyright as an incentive to create—in the standard
incentives story—depends directly on the cost-effectiveness of
enforcement. In other words, the costs (and benefits) of
enforcing / litigating the claim are just as integral as the costs (and benefits)
of creation to the copyright system’s realization of its fundamental
utilitarian goal.110
Two important qualifications are in order here. First, the argument
above assumes that what are described as enforcement costs map onto
litigation costs. One might argue that the exclusive rights could indeed be
enforced independent of litigation—for example, through technological
measures, cease-and-desist letters, and the like.111 It bears emphasizing that
while these mechanisms may not constitute forms of “litigation” strictly
speaking, their effectiveness is always dependent on eventual recourse to
litigation. In other words, enforcement by self-help is always parasitic on
the threat of eventual litigation and happens in the shadow of the law.112 As
a result, ex ante calculations of enforcement must invariably consider the
possibility of litigation. Second, copyright’s benefits can certainly be seen
110. In some ways, it is surprising that the litigation and enforcement costs of the copyright
system have not been taken to impact its ability to function as an incentive to create. The analogous
point has for long shown to be true in relation to the deterrence function of tort law, namely that when
litigation costs are excessive, a regime of liability is likely to underdeter, since the incentive to take
adequate precautions is reduced. See Keith N. Hylton, Litigation Costs and the Economic Theory of
Tort Law, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 111, 113–14 (1991); Keith N. Hylton, The Influence of Litigation Costs
on Deterrence Under Strict Liability and Under Negligence, 10 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 161, 161 (1990)
(developing a model to show how strict liability and negligence rules lead to underdeterrence when
litigation costs are taken into account); Thomas J. Miceli, Deterrence, Litigation Costs, and the Statute
of Limitations for Tort Suits, 20 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 383, 393 (2000) (developing Hylton’s model
further).
111. Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1089, 1092–94 (1998); Kenneth W. Dam, Self-Help in the Digital Jungle, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 393, 397–
402 (1999).
112. Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968, 997 (1979) (showing how interactions against the backdrop of
a legal regime occur in “the shadow of the law”).
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as entailing more than just the benefits of enforcing the entitlement. Since
the entitlement is inherently marketable (that is, through licenses, transfers,
and assignments), the very possibility of such contractual transfers might
generate important benefits for the creator. The fact remains, however, that
such purely contractual benefits are on their own likely to be fairly
marginal when unbundled from the possibility of their enforcement. When
contracting parties recognize that the possibility of the claim being
enforced is cost prohibitive or unviable, the claim is likely to be valued at a
much lower level, rendering its benefits to the transferor marginal.
Returning then to the main point, that copyright’s incentive to create
must factor in the incentive to litigate the copyright claim, allows us to now
further specify the idea. Incentives to litigate a claim—for a rational private
actor—can in similar terms be mapped onto the costs and benefits of a
recovery. The benefits from litigation are thus the difference between the
probabilistic expected recovery (or damages), and the costs of litigation,
often represented by the formula113: BL = p(D) - CL, where BL represents
the benefit from litigation or the expected value from litigation, p the
probability of succeeding in a recovery, D the damages that the recovery is
likely to result in, and CL the costs that the litigation entails. Only when this
produces a positive yield for an actor, will it make sense to litigate.114
If copyright law’s market-preserving benefits (previously B©) consist
in large part of the benefits from enforcing / litigating the copyright claim
(BL) and the marginal benefits that flow directly from the copyright
entitlement (BDir), then the original calculus for the incentive to create (B©
> CC) therefore becomes effectively: [BDir + p(D)] > [CC + CL]. In other
words, for copyright to work as a rational inducement to create, the sum of
the marginal nonenforcement benefits and the probabilistic recovery from
enforcement must exceed the costs of creating the work and enforcing the
claim.
Copyright’s fundamental utilitarian goal of inducing creativity thus
takes shape in significant part from the mechanism that the law sets up to
enforce its grant of exclusivity to creators. The realization of this social
goal is, as a result, contingent on the cost-effectiveness of the enforcement
mechanism for creators. Altering the costs, benefits, and probabilities of
recovery thus affects not just the incentive to litigate, but presumptively the
very incentive to create. In this respect, copyright law tracks other areas of
113. SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE 22 (2010). See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 882 (1998).
114. FARHANG, supra note 113, at 22.
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law in which Congress seeks to motivate private actors to bring claims, in
the belief that by so doing, a broader social goal is likely to be realized.115
The reason this matters, we shall soon see, is because the copyright troll
operates by driving a neat wedge between the two incentives, and in the
process disrupts the continuity on which the regime is predicated.
B. SORTING COPYRIGHT CLAIMS—A HIDDEN EQUILIBRIUM
In addition to relying on private enforcement to achieve its social goal,
copyright also depends entirely on its private-law apparatus to realize an
additional institutional function—namely, that of differentiating between
various types of copyright claims. This function is in many ways parasitic
on its social goal, but is nonetheless important to the smooth functioning of
the system. In delegating the decision whether to enforce a claim against a
copier to the copyright owner (the right-holder), copyright law allows rightholders to decide precisely what kinds of claims they want to litigate and
enforce. Yet, copyright’s delegation of this decision is not unbridled, for
the decision derives from the variables that impact the decision to litigate,
which are in turn under the control of the state.116 Given the regime’s
purported realization of its social goal through litigation, this controlled
delegation can be seen as emanating from the institution’s basic premise on
the alignment of the incentive to create with the incentive to litigate. This
framework requires some unbundling.
“Not all copying, however, is copyright infringement.”117 Perhaps
more importantly though, not all copyright infringement is likely to result
in liability. This is because the decision whether to enforce a claim (and
impose liability on a defendant) is very often influenced by costs and
variables that make it both impractical and inefficient for the copyright
owner to commence an action.118 Putting these two concepts together, we
see that potential copyright claims can thus be categorized, broadly
speaking, into three basic categories.
Actionable and Enforced Claims (Type I). This category covers claims
that constitute acts of infringement as a legal matter and which are in fact
115. Id. at 30–31.
116. Indeed, some argue that statutory regimes which delegate their enforcement to private actors
do so for political reasons having to do with interbranch dynamics and the avoidance of gridlock. See
id. at 31–37 (discussing political reasons for Congress using private actor enforcement in regards to the
judicial and executive branches).
117. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
118. See Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive, supra note 20, at 333, 337–38
(providing numerical hypotheticals where a private party may or may not bring suit based on costs).
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enforced by the copyright owner because it makes economic sense to
enforce them. Paradigmatic of this category are instances of competitive
copying, where the copyright owner suffers direct, recurring harm.119 The
action is commenced upon the recognition that the potential recovery is
very likely to exceed the harm from allowing the copying to continue
unabated.
Actionable but Tolerated Claims (Type II). This is the most important
category for our purposes and covers claims that as a matter of law
constitute infringement, but are nonetheless treated as nonactionable by
copyright owners through their conscious inaction. Tim Wu calls uses that
form the basis of these claims “tolerated uses” and posits that they come
about when the copyright owner chooses not to enforce its rights for
reasons of “simple laziness or enforcement costs, a desire to create
goodwill, or a calculation that the infringement . . . actually benefits the
owner.”120 Examples include copying by fan fiction websites, or the private
home copying of literary, musical, or audiovisual works by consumers.121
Nonactionable Claims (Type III). These are typically instances of
copying that the law (as opposed to the individual copyright owner) treats
as noninfringing to begin with. The most prominent claims in this category
are instances of fair use, which the law treats as independently
legitimate.122 Also included are instances of copying that do not meet the
“substantial similarity” requirement,123 and forms of copying under a
statutory exemption124 or implied license.125 The key analytical point here
is that these claims are rendered nonactionable as a matter of law. Private
parties, in other words, have little say in expanding or contracting this
category.126
119. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 45 (2010) (discussing
the idea of defining copyright as a right to commercial exploitation); Lydia Pallas Loren, The Evolving
Role of “For Profit” Use in Copyright Law: Lessons from the 1909 Act, 26 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 255, 281–84 (2010) (discussing commercial harm).
120. Wu, supra note 21, at 619.
121. Id. (providing an example of a fan fiction site as a “tolerated use”). See also Jessica Litman,
Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871, 1895–1903 (2007) (discussing private home copying of
protected works).
122. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (listing factors to be considered in determining fair use).
123. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Normativity of Copying in Copyright Law, 62 DUKE L.J.
203, 206 (2012) (describing substantial similarity and its role in copyright law).
124. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 108–112.
125. See generally, e.g., Orit Fischman Afori, Implied License: An Emerging New Standard in
Copyright Law, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 275, 281–87 (2009) (discussing the
traditional use of implied licenses in copyright law).
126. Fair use thus operates as a mandatory, rather than default rule, and cannot be contracted
away. See David Nimmer, Elliot Brown & Gary N. Frischling, The Metamorphosis of Contract into
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What is crucial for our purposes, however, is the fact that copyright
law—in its reliance on private enforcement—actively delegates to
copyright owners the process of categorizing claims into the first two
categories, that is Types I and II. As between Types I and II on the one
hand, and Type III on the other, the law gives copyright owners no
discretion whatsoever, and instead treats the classification as mandatory.
Between Types I and II however, copyright law (that is, doctrine) says
nothing at all. The decision is an entirely private one and resembles the
gatekeeping function that ownership performs in property law.127 Just as a
property owner gets to decide who to treat as an uninvited but welcome
guest and who to treat as a trespasser, copyright owners get to choose what
kinds of uses (and hence claims) to treat as actionable and enforced, as
opposed to actionable but tolerated.128
This raises the obvious question then of identifying the criteria by
which copyright owners separate these claims and how they make the
decision to enforce some but not all. Here, we return back to the factors
that influence the decision whether to litigate / enforce the claim to begin
with. The decision to litigate is contingent upon the expected benefit from
litigation exceeding its expected costs, or the costs of litigation when
subtracted from the probabilistic recovery of damages producing a positive
payout to the plaintiff: p(D) > CL, since BL = p(D) - CL.129 On the
continuing assumption that the decision whether to commence an
infringement action or not is a rational economic one, we may readily
conclude that when p(D) < CL, these claims fall into the category of
actionable but tolerated.
What is important to recognize is that the variables in question,
namely, the costs of litigation, the probability of success, and the damages
recoverable are not necessarily individual to each plaintiff, but instead
develop a level of uniformity over time. For instance, the litigation costs
involve, among other things, the cost of finding a lawyer, paying the
attorney’s fees for representation, paying the court fees, the costs of
negotiating a settlement, and the indirect costs that litigation entails (for
example, involving reputation, goodwill, and the like). These are often
independent of an individual plaintiff and also show a surprising level of
consistency across diverse subject matter. As a result, sorting between
Expand, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 17, 68 (1999).
127. Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 289
(2008).
128. Id. at 289–90.
129. FARHANG, supra note 113, at 22.
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Type I and Type II claims begins to occur as a system-wide phenomenon,
rather than an individual one. In other words, certain kinds of claims begin
to fall into Type II rather than Type I because it makes little economic
sense for a rational, individual utility-maximizing plaintiff to enforce them,
regardless of the specifics of the plaintiff and defendant. An example best
illustrates this point.
Jason is an amateur artist. Enamored by a movie poster for the movie
Avatar that he comes across, he decides to paint an oil reproduction of the
poster at home. He buys an authorized copy of the poster and produces
three oil paintings that are each virtually identical to the original. He hangs
each up in a different room of his house for his friends to admire when they
visit him. As a purely doctrinal matter, Jason’s actions do not fall under any
of the copyright statute’s exemptions from infringement, including the fair
use doctrine; meaning it is in theory actionable.130 Now assume that one
day, a representative of the movie studio Lightstorm Entertainment—which
owns the rights to the original poster—visits Jason. Will Lightstorm likely
choose to enforce its claim against Jason?
Clearly not. As a rational actor, Lightstorm will realize that:
(1) Jason’s actions were not for profit and did not produce a negative
market effect (harm) on the sale of its own poster; (2) a court / jury is likely
to be sympathetic to Jason’s “personal use” of the protected work (the
probability of recovery, p, say hypothetically is thus closer to 0.4);131
(3) even if it succeeds, and elects to recover statutory damages (since there
are no actual damages), its recovery (D) will likely be closer to the
minimum $750, since proving that Jason’s actions were willful is extremely
difficult;132 and (4) the costs of hiring a law firm, initiating the action, and
going through the litigation will likely be (hypothetically) at least $5,000
(CL). Putting it all together, enforcing the claim will come at a net loss of
$4,700 (5000 - (.4)750), giving Lightstorm no incentive to enforce the
claim. Over time though, the same type of calculation is likely to be applied
by a majority of copyright owners to most types of personal home
reproductions of protected works—making it highly unlikely that such
claims will be enforced and effectively pushing such uses into the category
of actionable but tolerated uses.
130. See Litman, supra note 121, at 1903 (describing such acts as infringing in the “nominal”
sense).
131. Id. at 1878–79 (describing a personal use as one in which “even the most rapacious copyright
owners have always agreed that some uses are lawful even though they are neither exempted or
privileged in the copyright statute nor recognized as legal by any judicial decision”).
132. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006).
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One might worry that if the costs of litigating / enforcing the claim in
such Type II claims is prohibitive, it might affect Type I claims as well—
effectively interfering with the incentive to litigate, which as we saw, feeds
into the very incentive to create. This is where Congress and the federal
courts have the power to step in and alter the calculus, as they deem
necessary.133 Through modifications in the law, they can alter the expected
recovery (D), the probability of such recovery (p) and the costs of
litigation, so as to ensure that at any point in time there remains a balance
between Type I and Type II claims, making it viable for some copyright
claims to be brought and enforced, in turn furthering copyright’s purpose of
motivating creativity. This point bears emphasis for it reveals two
extremely important things about the enforcement of copyright claims:
first, that the balance between Type I and Type II claims is realized through
private copyright owners’ calculations of when it makes economic sense to
enforce; and second, that Congress and the courts are always in a position
to influence this balance through changes in the law, if and when they find
that the balance is impeding copyright’s social purpose of inducing
creativity.
Copyright law at all times contains a balance not just between Type I
and Type III, or actionable and nonactionable claims, but also a balance
between Type I and Type II, or actionable and enforced, and actionable but
tolerated claims. As long as the expected benefits for potential Type I
claims are significant enough, the incentive to create continues to be
fuelled by copyright. When Congress and the courts have reason to suspect
that the balance is problematic such that it is likely to impact the incentive
to create, they alter the variables. A case in point is Congress’s introduction
of statutory damages into the Copyright Act in 1909, when it recognized
that copyright owners were finding it “difficult to prove how much damage
they had suffered.”134 Presumably then, Congress realized that this
difficulty was expanding the scope of Type II claims—since it affected the
variable p(D)—and chose to fix it in an effort to push claims back into the
category of actionable and enforced.
What this reveals is that copyright law as a structural matter, contains
an underappreciated enforcement equilibrium, manifested in the ratio of
Type I to Type II claims. This equilibrium is maintained entirely through
the rational economic decisions of private copyright owners, with periodic
support and tailoring from Congress and the federal judiciary. By ensuring
133. See FARHANG, supra note 113, at 24–28 (showing how Congress can do this in numerous
domains).
134. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 54, at 446.
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that the costs of bringing certain kinds of claims—measured in terms of
primary litigation costs, and the secondary reputational, social, and longterm market consequences of such actions—exceeds any likely recovery,
copyright law ensures that certain kinds of claims remain de facto lawful,
even when legally actionable. Indeed, this balance is precisely why we
have a host of “gray area” uses that while infringing in the nominal sense
are nonetheless rampant.135
As a species of transaction costs, litigation costs are routinely taken to
be wasteful, and worthy of being minimized (if not eliminated).136 Yet,
much like positive transaction costs, which can produce certain beneficial
outcomes contextually,137 positive litigation costs are responsible for the
Type I / Type II equilibrium, which injects added breathing space into any
private enforcement regime. Positive litigation costs, in other words,
perform an important “cautionary function,” by forcing plaintiffs to assess
the costs and benefits of their actions before enforcing their claims. 138 This
cautionary function in turn produces beneficial spillover effects to the rest
of society, manifested in the maintenance of a large set of Type II claims.
What is perhaps most important to appreciate about this equilibrium,
which may seem otherwise uncontroversial, is that it forms an essential
boundary condition for copyright’s functioning as an incentive to create. In
other words, it represents a calibration of the amount of incentive—in
terms of the expected value from copyright—needed to stimulate creativity.
This calibration, however, is done by copyright owners themselves in the
aggregate. This is where the fact that the equilibrium originates entirely in
the aggregated calculations of private copyright owners over time, while
supported by alterations in the law as circumstances change, assumes
significance. This certainly is not to suggest that the equilibrium never
changes. Indeed, quite independent of legislative activity (which is in some
sense responsive to the demands of private actors), private actors can
themselves come to recognize that the balance of Type I to Type II claims
is inappropriate (that is, inadequate) to serve as an inducement for
creativity. When this occurs, copyright owners begin to alter their calculus,
135. Wu, supra note 21, at 633.
136. See, e.g., Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After Judgment? A
Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 410 (1999); Pierre Schlag, The Problem of
Transaction Costs, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1661, 1685 (1989).
137. For the leading account on the contextual benefits of positive transaction costs, see David M.
Driesen & Shubha Ghosh, The Functions of Transaction Costs: Rethinking Transaction Cost
Minimization in a World of Friction, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 61, 85–103 (2005).
138. Cf. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800 (1941) (describing
how consideration in contract law acts as a “check against inconsiderate action”).
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often ignoring the costs of enforcing previously tolerated claims and
incurring short-term losses to instigate long term benefits. A prime example
of this phenomenon is the recording industry’s campaign against file
sharing.139
In 2003, as the practice of peer-to-peer file sharing started becoming
common among college and high school students, recording studios began
to worry that such digital downloads would diminish their revenues from
regular sales.140 Individual actions against downloaders had until then
remained a paradigmatic Type II, or actionable but tolerated claim, since
the recovery was costly and had little expected value.141 Nonetheless,
recording studios under the rubric of the Recording Industry Association of
America (“RIAA”), decided that there remained a hidden benefit to such
otherwise economically inefficient lawsuits—namely, their deterrent effect
on other potential downloaders.142 The recording studios thus made the
calculation that even if bringing the individual lawsuits proved inefficient,
it was likely to generate quantifiable long-term benefits that might render it
worthwhile in due course. Between 2003 and 2008, the RIAA then
commenced about 18,000 lawsuits against downloaders at a huge loss, but
which they hoped would deter further downloading on peer-to-peer
networks.143 Evidence seems to suggest that this campaign had little to no
deterrent effect on individual downloaders, with the RIAA eventually
abandoning the campaign.144 Nonetheless, the concerted action by the
copyright owners did have the effect of altering the equilibrium of
nonenforcement for peer-to-peer private copying, which had until then
been tolerated. Scholars referred to this as a “historical shift” that occurred
139. For some literature documenting this, see Justin Hughes, On the Logic of Suing One’s
Customers and the Dilemma of Infringement-Based Business Models, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
725, 744–50 (2005); Litman, supra note 121, at 1876–77; and Jessica Litman, The Sony Paradox, 55
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 917, 958 (2005).
140. See David Kravets, Copyright Lawsuits Plummet in Aftermath of RIAA Campaign, WIRED
(May 18, 2010, 1:24 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/05/riaa-bump/ (noting how the
campaign began in September 2003).
141. Litman, supra note 121, at 1877.
142. Id.; Hughes, supra note 139, at 744.
143. Nate Anderson, Has the RIAA Sued 18,000 People . . . or 35,000?, ARS TECHNICA (July 8,
2009, 11:50 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/07/has-the-riaa-sued-18000-people-or35000.ars; Kravets, supra note 140; Mike Masnick, RIAA Spent $17.6 Million in Lawsuits . . . to Get
$391,000 in Settlements?, TECHDIRT (July 14, 2010, 9:44 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20100713/17400810200.shtml.
144. Mike Masnick, Defining Success: Were the RIAA’s Lawsuits a Success or Not?, TECHDIRT
(June 7, 2010, 11:15 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100606/2308559704.shtml (arguing that
the campaign was not a success). But see Litman, supra note 121, at 1877 (discussing the deterrent
effects of infringement lawsuits against potential downloaders).
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in copyright enforcement145—brought about entirely through the action of
owners. They had thus succeeded in altering the equilibrium, by moving
such downloading from Type II to Type I, independent of its effect on
deterrence and social norms among downloaders.146 Individual home
downloading is today viewed as likely to trigger an infringement action.
Despite the fact that the equilibrium of Type I and II claims plays an
important role in constituting the incentive that copyright law creates, it has
thus far received little attention in attempts to understand copyright’s
incentive framework. The “incentives-access” framework first developed
by Arrow is thought to inform standard economic accounts of copyright
law;147 and yet, few recognize that actionable but tolerated claims play an
important role in framing the boundary between incentives and access,
which has traditionally been thought to derive entirely from copyright
law’s doctrinal filters between protectable and unprotectable material.148
The typology and equilibrium described here reveal that the balance is
maintained not just by protectability, but also by enforcement levels.
Note that thus far, we have avoided much discussion of nonactionable
claims, of which fair use claims are the most common. The problem with
fair use however is that given its uncertainty, its borders remain unclear.149
As a result, while much of what is colloquially understood as fair use
represents Type III, some of what is taken to be fair use is in reality Type
II. Given that the decision whether something is in Type II or instead in
Type I (and therefore enforced) is entirely a private decision delegated to
copyright owners, potential defendants have little ability to contribute to
the scope of Type II claims on their own. This is another way of saying that
the balance between Type I and Type II claims is entirely a factor of costs
and benefits specific to potential plaintiffs, which reveals its stability over
time. Once again, Congress and the courts can of course, carve certain
claims out of Type II and put them into Type III, and indeed they have
done so in the past.
145. Ben Depoorter & Sven Vanneste, Norms and Enforcement: The Case Against Copyright
Litigation, 84 OR. L. REV. 1127, 1127 (2005).
146. See Litman, supra note 121, at 1877 (describing possible effects on deterrence and personal
uses).
147. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 617
(Universities-National Bureau ed., 1962) (setting up what would become the paradigm).
148. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49
VAND. L. REV. 483, 484–90 (1996) (discussing the balance between incentives and access).
149. See, e.g., Litman, supra note 121, at 1873–74 (discussing some of the unclear applications of
fair use).
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C. THE EQUILIBRIUM AS A FOCAL POINT
The balance between Type I and Type II claims described above—the
“equilibrium”—is more than just a descriptive reality of the copyright
system. It is also of deep functional significance to the institution, which
makes its erosion through artificial mechanisms troubling. The importance
of balance in copyright law is hardly new and is well documented in the
literature.150 Given that copyright protection produces large costs over
time, the importance of safety valves to minimize the system’s costs to
society has for long been seen as essential to its functioning and legitimacy.
Fair use, the idea-expression dichotomy, originality, and a host of other
devices internal to copyright doctrine are thus seen as performing this
balancing function.151
While the Type I / Type II equilibrium contributes in a similar vein to
copyright’s basic ideal of balance, in turn central to the incentives-access
tradeoff that economic accounts of copyright law rely on, 152 there is also
something fundamentally different (and important) about it. Since it
originates in market-based calculations that copyright owners themselves
are forced to make over a period of time, the balance partakes of a
“spontaneous order,”153 analogous to customary regimes in which
participants have greater control over the content of the rules that govern
them. The balance thus assumes a different kind of normativity from the
150. For recent work on this topic, see generally Abraham Drassinower, From Distribution to
Dialogue: Remarks on the Concept of Balance in Copyright Law, 34 J. CORP. L. 991 (2009) (discussing
the importance of balance between users and authors in the Canadian copyright system), and Peter B.
Maggs, The Balance of Copyright in the United States of America, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 369 (2010)
(describing the copyright balancing that has occurred in Congress and the courts).
151. See generally Robert Kasunic, Preserving the Traditional Contours of Copyright, 30 COLUM.
J.L. & ARTS 397 (2007) (“[T]he Supreme Court identified the common law doctrines of the
idea/expression dichotomy and fair use as critical internal free speech safeguards that must be preserved
if copyright is to be harmonized with the First Amendment.”); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Breathing
Space, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 429 (2007) (discussing the idea-expression dichotomy and the fair use
doctrine as free-speech safeguards that “keep copyright law from extending too far and limiting the
speech rights of others”).
152. See LANDES & POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE, supra note 105, at 21–24 (highlighting
some of the costs and tradeoffs in intellectual property law).
153. Friedrich Hayek is credited with developing this idea. See 3 F. A. HAYEK, LAW,
LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE xii, 158 (1979) (describing it as
synonymous with “self-generating order” or “self-organizing structures”); A. I. Ogus, Law and
Spontaneous Order: Hayek’s Contribution to Legal Theory, 16 J.L. & SOC’Y 393, 394–98 (1989)
(discussing spontaneous order as it exists in the market and in the law); Francesco Parisi, Toward a
Theory of Spontaneous Law, 6 CONST. POL. ECON. 211, 211–13 (1995) (discussing the spontaneous
emergence of law); Robert Sugden, Spontaneous Order, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 85, 85 (1989) (providing an
anecdote about a self-enforcing rule as an example of spontaneous order).
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one ordinarily communicated and enforced by the rest of copyright law.154
As a private law institution, copyright law is structured to speak
through relational directives of rights and duties. Being an obligatory (as
opposed to optional) regime, its private law architecture is composed of a
set of “exclusive rights” that operate through their correlative duties “not to
copy” and compels individuals to behave, or refrain from behaving in
certain ways.155 Copyright’s legal rules therefore communicate a formal
legal normativity, largely analogous to other areas of law. By declaring
certain actions to be within the exclusive providence of the copyright
owner, the law directs others not to engage in those actions and subjects
them to the possibility of legal liability if they choose not to comply.
The Type I / Type II equilibrium however is devoid of any formal
normative significance. Being neither a direct nor delegated creation of the
law, but rather a reality of the enforcement environment, its status is more
de facto than de jure. This hardly suggests that it is not of great importance.
To the contrary, it performs a crucial coordination function in the creative
marketplace as a “focal point” for interactions between copyright owners,
users, and copiers.
The typical interaction between a copyright owner and a private
(noncommercial) copier in the marketplace can be understood as one of
coordination, rather than pure conflict. A coordination situation (in Game
Theory) is one where the interests of parties are aligned to some degree
(even if not completely), and yet this fact alone does not ensure that they
will act to further their aligned self-interest.156 The literature is replete with
examples of such coordination: cars on a street seeking to proceed in an
orderly and efficient manner; rowers on both sides of a boat seeking to
move the boat in the same direction; hunters trying to catch a common
prey; and so on.157 Users and copiers care deeply about many of the uses
that fall into the category of “actionable but tolerated” (or “tolerated”),
since they contribute to the effective consumption and use of creative
works. Indeed, some scholars describe the allowance for such uses as an
integral part of the free speech and liberty interests that users have, even if
154. For copyright’s traditional normativity, see Balganesh, supra note 19, at 1677–82
(identifying the normative justifications for why copying is a wrong).
155. Id. at 1667–74.
156. Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1655
(2000) (“In a coordination game, players have common interests, but this fact does not guarantee that
the players will do the best they can for themselves.”).
157. Id. at 1655–58.
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copyright law treats them as formally actionable.158 Copyright owners also
remain indifferent to such uses as we discussed, so long as they do not eat
into their revenues (that is, as long as they remain within the zone of
tolerance), for example, by turning commercial or competitive. In some
instances, copyright owners might not just be indifferent to such uses, but
might instead seek to encourage them—given their spillover effects on the
primary market for the work in question (for example, fan fiction or
sampling).159 The two sides’ interests are thus aligned, but absent some
formal communication, there is no guarantee that they will coordinate—
that is, copyright owners will refrain from enforcing their claims, and
private users will use and consume the work within the zone of
tolerance.160
In such situations needing coordination, scholars have posited that
very often “focal points” tend to spontaneously emerge, either through the
interaction of parties over time or through a third party, which has the
effect of making some information salient, thereby inducing the
coordination that both parties desire.161 What is critical to appreciate
though is that these focal points need not be endowed with any normative
significance for them to work.162 All that they do is raise the salience of one
option over others, causing parties to converge around that option.163 The
focal point thus generates credible expectations on each side as to the
behavior of the other, which allow them to move forward collectively.164
Since focal points do not work through their formal normativity, their
origins matter very little. A focal point might thus originate in a third party
(for example, a government) or indeed through the action of one side of the
interaction over time. It is precisely in this manner that the equilibrium
described before operates.
Over a period of time, when copyright owners decide not to enforce
certain kinds of actionable claims (Type II claims), it has the effect of
158. See Litman, supra note 121, at 1918–19 (“A healthy copyright system requires an
equilibrium between copyright owners’ rights to exploit works and individuals’ liberties to enjoy
them.”).
159. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 445–46 (1984)
(noting how some copyright owners “welcome the practice” of unauthorized copying in some contexts).
160. McAdams, supra note 156, at 1658 (discussing the importance of communication in
facilitating coordination).
161. Id. at 1658–63.
162. Id. at 1666 (“But the moral authority to legitimacy of law is not necessary to create a focal
point.”).
163. Id. at 1664–66.
164. Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and
Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 231 (2009).
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communicating a signal to users and copiers. While it certainly does not
carry any normative significance in the sense of binding the copyright
owner, it nonetheless assumes a certain amount of salience that is sufficient
to enable owners and users to coordinate their actions.165 Copyright
owners’ behavior over time thus creates a self-fulfilling expectation that
behavior of a certain kind will occur, even if it is not formally obligatory. It
creates a credible expectation that certain kinds of unauthorized copying
and use on the part of the public will likely not be enforced against them,
even though such enforcement is permitted as a formal legal matter.
Indeed, the significance of such Type II uses, despite their
nonobligatory status, was emphasized by the Supreme Court in Sony Corp.
of America, Inc. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. otherwise known for its
doctrine of substantial noninfringing uses in the area of contributory
liability.166 There, the Court noted how significant it was that several
copyright owners readily testified (at trial) that they viewed certain kinds of
copying as permissible.167 It thus noted that one prominent copyright owner
“had absolutely no objection to home taping for noncommercial use” and
that numerous such owners had no objection to, and indeed “welcome[d]”
such copying for various reasons.168 Particularly telling is the Court’s
conclusion that “the owner of a copyright may well have economic or
noneconomic reasons for permitting certain kinds of copying to occur” and
that “[i]t is not the role of the courts to tell copyright holders the best way
for them to exploit their copyrights.”169 The Court repeatedly emphasized
that it was using these findings not to accord the behavior normative
significance—for example, as a collective implied license—but instead to
conclude that such uses were de facto noninfringing because of the
copyright owners’ own inaction, which the users and copiers of the
protected work could legitimately rely on.170 In other words, the Court too
seems to have thought the existence of Type II claims and the identification
of the demarcating line between Type I and Type II to be both salient and
behavior influencing as a focal point. Indeed, the Court’s own recognition
and validation of such uses can be seen as giving it additional prominence
165. For an attempt to convert the equilibrium into a normative commitment, see Wu, supra note
21, at 633–34 (advocating the creation of “copyright no action policies” by copyright owners that
commits them to not enforcing actionable but tolerated uses).
166. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 444 (1984) (identifying
evidence that home recordings of certain television broadcasts were authorized by the copyright
holders, thus demonstrating “a significant potential for future authorized copying”).
167. Id. at 444–46.
168. Id. at 445–46.
169. Id. at 446 n.28.
170. Id. at 446.
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and salience to this end.
Nobel Laureate Thomas Schelling, who is commonly credited with
developing the idea of focal points, observes that a “prime characteristic”
of such focal points is that they introduce an element of “prominence or
conspicuousness” into the situation—one that depends on “time and place
and who the people are.”171 “[W]ho the parties are and what they know
about each other” is thus an extremely important determinant for the
emergence and continuing significance of such focal points.172 The credible
expectation that a focal point creates is thus heavily dependent on one party
being able to understand the reasoning and thinking that goes into the
other’s decision, which is in turn dependent on the characteristics and
incentives of both sides remaining relatively static over time, place, and
context. In our situation, members of the public who seek to use
copyrighted works must thus be able to understand how (and perhaps why)
copyright owners will not enforce Type II claims, for the equilibrium to
operate as a focal point and vice versa, which in turn necessitates a set of
minimum shared characteristics on both sides. Indeed, it is precisely this
element that the troll’s actions alter, in the process changing both the
equilibrium and its ability to operate as a focal point for coordination
between owners and copiers. The next section details this process.
D. THE COPYRIGHT TROLL, THE ENFORCEMENT EQUILIBRIUM, AND THE
UNEASE
To this point, we have avoided any discussion of the copyright troll
and its interaction with the enforcement equilibrium built into copyright
law. It is precisely because of the existence of this equilibrium that the
troll’s actions start to become problematic. Its unique set of market
motivations and structural features turn the equilibrium—fragile, unstable,
and dependent on private actors—on its head. In the process, it risks
disrupting the connection between copyright enforcement and the
institution’s fundamental purposes of inducing creativity through the
market.
When the copyright troll steps into the shoes of the copyright owner
by acquiring an actionable copyright claim, it brings several of its
advantages to the enforcement game. The first is its expertise in enforcing
copyright claims. The troll is usually comprised of individuals with
experience enforcing and litigating copyright claims—that is, copyright
171.
172.

THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 57–58 (1960).
Id. at 57.
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lawyers. As a result, the transaction costs of initiating the claim decrease
quite dramatically, eliminating the need for external counsel altogether.
Second is its reliance on scale. To the copyright troll, the substance of an
individual claim matters much less than its aggregate returns from the
enforcement of multiple claims. This explains why it is able to settle each
claim for amounts much lower than the damages it seeks. Yet, when
aggregated together, the settlements prove to be beneficial. Third, the
copyright troll focuses entirely on its short-term gains from enforcement.
Not being a participant in the market for creative works, and therefore with
no customer base as such, it has little to worry about in terms of the
reputational consequences of going after defendants indiscriminately and of
suing parties who to traditional copyright owners constitute their
customers.173
Going back then to the incentive to enforce a claim, represented by the
idea of BL = p(D) - CL, what we begin to see is that the copyright troll is
able to quite significantly lower its litigation costs (CL) because of its cost
efficiencies and expertise, and at the same time raise its probability of
success (p), once again owing to its expertise and systematic enforcement,
altering its expected payoff from the enforcement of the claim. Its expected
benefits from litigating / enforcing the claim (BL) are thus significantly
higher than that of the original copyright owner, that is, the creator, as a
result of these features. The reason this matters, however, is because it has
the effect of altering the balance between Type I and Type II claims
described earlier.174 Recall that what held the balance between the two
categories was the fact that at some point, for a large variety of claims p(D)
< CL, and as a result of which, those claims are not litigated / enforced.175
This too, however, is hardly problematic, for as we noted earlier, the
equilibrium is hardly immutable, and copyright owners do occasionally try
to change the balance when they feel like the incentive provided by Type I
claims is insufficient.176 In this sense, the troll’s actions are no different
from an otherwise overzealous copyright owner, such as the RIAA,
described earlier.177 What differentiates the troll from the copyright owner,
however, is that its reasons for not adhering to the balance are not germane
173. See Hughes, supra note 139, at 727–28 (2005) (explaining that “conventional wisdom”
warned against suing one’s customers); Fred von Lohmann, Is Suing Your Customers a Good Idea?,
LAW.COM (Sept. 29, 2004), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005540575&Is_Suing_Your_
Customers_a_Good_Idea (evaluating the success of lawsuits against peer-to-peer file sharing).
174. See supra Part III.B.
175. See supra text accompanying note 129.
176. See supra text accompanying note 139.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 140–46.
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to copyright’s fundamental purpose.
As noted earlier, the balance between Type I and Type II copyright
claims can be seen as an essential boundary condition for the incentive to
create that copyright law provides creators.178 In other words, copyright
owners treat some claims as Type II, the point at which the returns from
enforcement are no longer deemed necessary for the inducement of creative
expression. Over time, this might change through the actions of copyright
owners, and when it does, the logic is normally that the marketplace for
creative expression necessitates higher expected returns, pushing tolerated
Type II claims into the category of enforced Type I claims in order to
produce those returns. While the balance between Type I and II claims is
changed through the concerted action of copyright owners in certain
domains, the copyright system ordinarily views that change as
unproblematic because it is taken to be a mere recalibration of the returns
needed to induce creativity, which the law delegates to copyright owners
themselves.179 Thus, when recording companies (copyright owners) start
enforcing infringement claims against noncommercial downloaders, the
system is compelled to see it as unproblematic because it is thought to
represent the fact that the copyright owners are merely reassessing an
equilibrium that represents the returns needed to continue producing music.
Given the connection between the incentives to create and enforce
described earlier, an increase in the costs of creating new works (CC)
necessitates greater cumulative recovery (p(D)), which accounts for the
change.180 In short, since copyright’s fundamental purpose is thought to lie
in providing creators with an inducement to produce original expression
through the market, alterations in the balance between Type I and Type II
claims that derive from that purpose remain unproblematic.
The troll’s attempt to change the balance, however, has very different
origins. The troll’s impetus for enforcing claims that would have otherwise
been actionable but tolerated originates not in the increased costs of
creating new works (CC)—since it obviously plays no role in the creation of
the work—but is instead a result of its ability to reduce its own litigation
costs (CL) and enhance its chances of recovery (p(D)), both of which raise
its expected payoffs from enforcing / litigating a copyright claim. To the
178. See supra text accompanying note 133.
179. Cf. Hughes, supra note 139, at 737, 743 (observing how the U.S. market for music sales
“contracted significantly” from 1998 to 2003, the period immediately prior to when the RIAA began to
commence hundreds of user lawsuits).
180. See id. at 744–46 (discussing how the recording industry’s legal actions could be creating an
optimal point).
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extent that the balance between Type I and Type II claims is not just a
contingent part of copyright’s incentive structure, but is instead integral to
its very functioning, the troll’s disruption of the balance can be seen as
emanating from reasons external to copyright’s basic purpose of producing
creative expression. It is precisely this aspect of copyright trolling that
differentiates it from any other attempt to overenforce copyright claims.
The real problem with the copyright troll thus lies in its disruption of the
balance between actionable and enforced (Type I) and actionable but
tolerated (Type II) claims for reasons that have nothing whatsoever to do
with copyright’s functioning as an incentive to create.181
The troll’s actions produce obvious harm for defendants who, relying
on the earlier equilibrium, perceived their actions to be actionable but
tolerated. The troll however does more than just render the actions of a few
defendants infringing and subject to liability. If allowed to continue
unimpeded, the troll’s actions would disrupt not just the equilibrium as it
exists at any given point in time, but also the very process by which the
equilibrium forms and functions as a mechanism of coordination. Therein
lies the real danger that trolling poses for the effective functioning of the
copyright system.
The equilibrium functions as a focal point because of its ability to
generate credible expectations for both copyright owners and copiers as to
the other’s behavior. The identities of parties, as noted earlier, plays a
major role in the development of such a focal point.182 When the copyright
troll enters the enforcement game and begins to enforce its right
indiscriminately, and by reference to its own set of motives and incentives
(which are different from traditional creator-owners), it affects the ability
of the equilibrium to function as a credible commitment from copyright
owners across a variety of domains and contexts. Users and copiers of
works whose actions would fit into the category of Type II claims now
181. A good analogy here is to the recent modifications to the copyright system that have in
similar fashion been thought to alter copyright’s balance. The retroactive term extension of twenty years
brought about by the Copyright Term Extension Act (“CTEA”) of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat.
2827, was seen by numerous parties as fundamentally problematic not just because it altered the
contours of the copyright system, which would have otherwise been fine given that copyright law has
been amended by Congress on numerous occasions, but because the extension to the exclusive rights
entitlement (by twenty years) was seen as bearing no connection at all to copyright’s fundamental
purpose. It was precisely because there was no evidence (or claim) that the extension was connected to
copyright’s inducement to create new expressive work, that many considered the CTEA deeply flawed.
Indeed, this formed the very basis of the unsuccessful constitutional challenge to the CTEA. See Eldred
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 210–12 (2003) (“[P]etitioners argue [the CTEA] does not stimulate the
creation of new works but merely adds value to works already created.”).
182. See supra Part III.C.
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have to worry that the very identity and reasoning of copyright owners has
changed, moving a greater number of Type II claims into Type I. Being
devoid of formal normative significance—that is, in not binding the party
generating the signal—the focal point begins to lose its salience as a
mechanism of coordination. With this development, the possibility that
Type II claims and the uses that they represent will disappear altogether
begins to loom large.
This lack of formal normativity is, unfortunately, also the reason why
the troll’s behavior is hard to fault as a matter of copyright law. Strictly
speaking, the troll has done nothing unlawful. Its actions are fully in
compliance with copyright law’s rules on transfers, standing, and recovery
of damages.183 Yet, its actions have the potential to disrupt an informal
dynamic in copyright law that is just as integral to the institution as its
formal framework of exclusive rights, privileges, and immunities. This, in
turn, explains why the case against copyright trolls is rather difficult. Since
its actions relate to an informal, uncodified part of the copyright system,
reining it in as a matter of formal law presents a host of challenges. Any
doctrinal tool employed to this end is likely to be either over- or
underdeterminative.
Take for instance the two approaches that courts used to rein in
Righthaven. Some courts expanded fair use to cover the defendant’s actions
of reproducing an article in its entirety.184 In so doing, these courts
effectively moved certain Type II claims into Type III simply in order to
disallow a recovery and preclude the troll from moving the claims into
Type I. Until this point, no court had ever concluded that such verbatim
copying could amount to a fair use. Consequently, these decisions surprised
both copiers and copyright owners, who quite legitimately viewed it as a
doctrinal aberration motivated by the courts’ purpose.185 A few other
courts, as noted before, invoked the Silvers rule to deny Righthaven formal
183. See supra Part II.B.
184. Righthaven LLC v. Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1151 (D. Nev. 2011).
185. See, e.g., Steve Green, Book, Record Industries Attack Righthaven Fair Use Ruling, VEGAS
INC. (Dec. 5, 2011, 9:26 PM), http://www.vegasinc.com/news/2011/dec/05/book-record-industriesattack-righthaven-fair-use-/ (describing the amicus curiae brief of copyright owners opposing the Hoehn
decision’s expansion of fair use). For an exhaustive treatment of the interrelation between copyright
trolling and fair use, see Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright Trolls and Presumptively Fair Uses, 85 U.
COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (making the normative case for copyright trolls to establish the
absence of fair use as a solution to the problem). It is worth noting that the district court’s expansive
interpretation of fair use was eventually vacated by the Ninth Circuit when it concluded that
Righthaven’s suit could be dismissed for lack of standing. Righthaven LLC v. Hoehn (Hoehn II), 716
F.3d 1166, 1172–73 (9th Cir. 2013).

2013]

COPYRIGHT TROLLING

769

standing to sue for infringement.186 Yet, as discussed, this approach can be
overcome by a tightly worded artificial assignment. In short then, the
absence of a viable doctrinal solution to the problem is a reflection of the
reality that the problem with the copyright troll is (1) entirely one of
copyright theory and policy that (2) is not formally embodied in copyright
law. The challenge thus lies in formulating a legal response that can
account for this reality, to which the next part turns.
IV. CURTAILING COPYRIGHT TROLLING DIRECTLY:
“COMPENSABLE HARM”
Having identified the real problem with copyright trolls to lie in the
fact that their reasons for enforcing copyright claims diverge rather
significantly from the institution’s fundamental purpose, this part moves to
the prescriptive and suggests mechanisms by which copyright trolls can be
controlled. In specific, any solution to the problem of copyright trolling
needs to focus directly on policing the entity’s motives and reasons for
enforcing copyright claims, while at the same time ensuring that it does not
(1) alter the contours of copyright’s traditional doctrines (such as fair use),
or (2) preclude a secondary market for copyright claims from developing
altogether. The approaches that courts currently adopt tend to do one or the
other, making them unviable as long-term solutions to the problem.
This part argues that a direct, more tailored solution lies in a rule that
introduces a heightened rule of standing for nonauthor plaintiffs, by
ensuring that the basis of their legal claims, in theory, tracks those of actual
authors-creators, who copyright law is primarily designed to serve. Such a
rule would require (1) nonauthor plaintiffs (for example, trolls) who in
infringement claims (2) elect for statutory damages (as opposed to actual
damages or injunctive relief) to establish that the defendant’s actions would
in principle have enabled a claim for “actual damages”187 and / or
attributable profits, the type of injury that copyright law’s statutory
damages allowance was “intended to prevent.”188 In other words, it would
make the availability of statutory damages for nonauthor plaintiffs depend
186. Hoehn, 792 F. Supp. 2d at 1144–47; Righthaven LLC v. Democratic Underground LLC, 791
F. Supp. 2d 968, 973, 975 (D. Nev. 2011). See also Righthaven, LLC v. Barham, No. 2:10-cv-02150RLH-PAL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66720, at *3–4 (D. Nev. June 22, 2011) (finding Righthaven lacked
standing based on the same analysis used in Democratic Underground and Hoehn); Righthaven, LLC v.
DiBiase, No. 2:10-cv-01343-RLH-PAL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67181, at *3–4 (D. Nev. June 22,
2011) (same).
187. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006).
188. Cf. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (applying
antitrust law).
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on their establishing the existence of some compensable harm.
A. A LIMITED ANALOGY TO THE ANTITRUST INJURY RULE
Scholars commonly make reference to antitrust law’s “antitrust
injury” rule to suggest that copyright law ought to incorporate an
equivalent rule of standing to limit plaintiffs’ claims to situations that relate
to copyright’s core objective of inducing creativity through the market.189
While no doubt well intentioned, this argument is hard to square with
copyright’s basic structure as a strict-liability tort. My claim here is, by
contrast, quite different. Subsequent interpretations (and applications) of
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc.,190 which is credited with formulating the antitrust injury rule, make
the claim that the Court was attempting to lay down a formal rule of
standing for all private plaintiffs in antitrust cases.191 Whether this is
accurate or not, the Court’s opinion in Brunswick also sheds important light
on how a federal statute’s remedial provisions ought to be understood and
interpreted, when the statute specifically contemplates private actions and
the realization of a public goal through such actions. This interpretive
approach should inform how courts approach the question of when
plaintiffs should be allowed to invoke copyright law’s allowance for
statutory damages.
Brunswick involved an action brought by a few individual bowling
centers, complaining that the defendant’s acquisition of a few other centers
in the region was in violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act, which regulated
anticompetitive mergers.192 The defendant was the largest owner-operator
of bowling centers in the region. The action was brought under § 4 of the
Act, which allowed a plaintiff to recover “threefold the damages” (treble
damages) upon establishing that it had been “injured in its business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws.”193 Speaking
for a unanimous Court, Justice Thurgood Marshall concluded that § 4
189. See, e.g., Christina Bohannan & Herbert Hovenkamp, IP and Antitrust: Reformation and
Harm, 51 B.C. L. REV. 905, 979–80 (2010) (proposing a “serious harm requirement” in copyright
cases); Sara K. Stadler, Copyright as Trade Regulation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 933–34 (2007) (noting
that, like antitrust law, copyright law “recognizes that some harms are not cognizable”); Shyamkrishna
Balganesh, Rethinking Copyright: Property Through the Lenses of Unjust Enrichment and Unfair
Competition, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 345, 346 (2008) (commenting on the analogy to the
“antitrust injury rule”).
190. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489.
191. 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA et al., ANTITRUST LAW 73 (3d ed. 2007).
192. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 479–80.
193. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2006).
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needed more than just any causal connection between the merger and the
plaintiffs’ injury, since mergers by their very nature cause some
dislocation.194 Instead, the plaintiffs needed to show “injury of the type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which
makes the defendants’ acts unlawful.”195 In other words, the causation
required to allow the claim had to originate in antitrust law’s fundamental
purpose of avoiding anticompetitive behavior and effects. Thus emerged
antitrust law’s “antitrust injury” rule, which has since become a formal
doctrine of standing in antitrust law.
Many scholars have suggested that copyright law (and indeed perhaps
all of intellectual property law) would stand to benefit from a similar injury
requirement—and that courts should allow copyright claims only when
plaintiffs succeed in showing harm to their incentives to create or distribute
the work in question.196 While this would certainly render nonactionable a
large number of copyright claims that do not directly further social welfare
by inducing creative expression, it is also likely to dramatically alter the
analytical structure of copyright law.
Liability for copyright infringement has always been seen as strict in
the sense that it requires neither a showing of fault nor proof of actual
harm.197 Making liability now depend on proof of injury is likely to alter
the contours of liability not just as a procedural matter (that is, as to
standing), but as a substantive one as well. As a private law regime,
copyright law depends entirely on private enforcement via infringement
suits for its functioning. Unlike antitrust law, in which private actions are
one of several forms of enforcement,198 the very existence and validity of a
copyright claim is dependent on a copyright owner’s ability to enforce it. In
the antitrust context, when a private plaintiff’s claim is dismissed under the
antitrust injury rule, it never precludes various other forms of enforcement.
As a purely analytical matter then, the underlying violation (of antitrust
laws) is not automatically legitimized since public enforcement continues
to remain viable. In copyright law, on the other hand, precluding an
infringement claim when proof of harm is lacking would serve to validate
the defendant’s actions given the absence of alternative enforcement
194. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 487.
195. Id. at 489.
196. See, e.g., Christina Bohannan, Copyright Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U.
L. REV. 969, 973, 1031 (2007) (supporting the Supreme Court’s development of a harm-based
approach); Stadler, supra note 189, at 933–34 (arguing for a stricter interpretation of “harm”).
197. Balganesh, supra note 19, at 1682.
198. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15a (suits by the United States); 15 U.S.C. § 15c (suits by State
Attorneys General).
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mechanisms.199 To the extent that copyright law is meant to operate as an
inducement to create, to the creator who understands that as a functional
matter the very existence of the entitlement is heavily dependent on proof
of harm, the rule is likely to impede the system’s operation. A full-blown
copyright injury rule—modeled on antitrust law’s antitrust injury
requirement—would operate as a substantive, rather than procedural bar.
And certainly for our purposes, it is likely to do much more than just curtail
trolling, since it would effectively alter all claims for copyright
infringement.
A more modest use of the antitrust analogy, however, also derives
from Brunswick. What analogies to Justice Marshall’s opinion routinely
ignore is the extent to which he focused on the remedial nature of the treble
damages provision that was in question.200 In other words, the opinion was
motivated in large part by the Clayton Act’s purported fusion of
compensatory and punitive (deterrent) objectives into the damages
provision, which in turn necessitated a rule that would unbundle the two.
Justice Marshall observed in Brunswick,
Section 4, in contrast [to Section 7], is in essence a remedial
provision. It provides treble damages to “[a]ny person who shall be
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws . . . .” Of course, treble damages also play an important
role in penalizing wrongdoers and deterring wrongdoing, as we also have
frequently observed. It nevertheless is true that the treble-damages
provision, which makes awards available only to injured parties, and
measures the awards by a multiple of the injury actually proved, is
designed primarily as a remedy.201

Justice Marshall was clearly observing that the Act’s damages
provision served two separate functions: a compensatory one and a punitive
one. Indeed, Congress’s conflation of the two played an important role in
the Court’s analysis when it went on to further note,
The discussions of [the treble damages remedy] on the floor of the
Senate indicate that it was conceived of primarily as a remedy for “[t]he
people of the United States as individuals,” especially consumers. Treble
damages were provided in part for punitive purposes, but also to make
the remedy meaningful . . . .202
199. To put the point in terms of a distinction drawn earlier, it would effectively remove acts of
copying that do not cause harm to the plaintiff out of the category of Type I claims, but its effect would
not just be to move it into Type II, but rather Type III—that is, noninfringing claims.
200. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 485.
201. Id. at 485–86 (citations omitted).
202. Id. at 486 n.10 (citations omitted).
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The antitrust injury rule was thus motivated primarily by the concern
that allowing a plaintiff to rely on a loose idea of causation, even if
demanded by the punitive dimension of the remedy, would dilute the
remedy of its compensatory significance. Despite later courts’ extension of
the logic to other antitrust remedies, the Brunswick Court saw its rule
intricately tied to the treble damages recovery being invoked. It thus
concluded that
for plaintiffs to recover treble damages on account of § 7 violations, they
must prove more than injury causally linked to an illegal presence in the
market [but instead an] antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type
the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that
which makes defendants’ acts unlawful. 203

Had the plaintiff been seeking just an injunction, one doubts that the Court
would have insisted on the same rule, even though later courts have
extended Brunswick in that direction.
Brunswick was thus in the end about standing for a damages recovery
that combined compensatory and punitive purposes. It provides us with a
narrower, and more direct framework with which to think about the
primary motivation of the copyright troll, namely copyright’s statutory
damages provision.
B. A RULE OF STANDING FOR NONAUTHOR PLAINTIFFS SEEKING
STATUTORY DAMAGES
Statutory damages were introduced into U.S. copyright law for the
first time in 1909.204 The primary reason for their introduction was to aid
courts and litigants in situations where it was difficult to prove and quantify
actual damages and lost profits.205 In attempting to facilitate the recovery of
actual damages through a fixed amount, their original purpose was thus
compensatory in nature.206 While the 1909 Act’s statutory damages
provision authorized courts to make awards that they considered just, the
law also set a range for such awards and provided suggested awards for
common types of infringements.207 Perhaps most importantly though, the
203. Id. at 489.
204. See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 54, at 446–47 (describing the historical context of
the 1909 Act).
205. Id. at 446 n.22 (detailing the legislative history of the 1909 Act’s statutory damages
provisions).
206. See, e.g., Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U.S. 207, 209 (1935) (discussing the compensatory
purpose).
207. 17 U.S.C. § 101(b) (1976).
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statute specifically provided that statutory damages were “not [to] be
regarded as a penalty,” thereby seemingly endowing them exclusively with
a compensatory dimension.208 Thus, courts routinely refused statutory
damages awards when plaintiffs could establish actual damages and lost
profits.209
In revising the statute in 1976, Congress altered much of this. In
addition to modifying the range for awards, the law eliminated suggested
awards amounts and the explicit recognition that awards were not to be
considered penalties.210 In due course, courts came to interpret the new
provision, § 504(c), as consciously embodying a punitive dimension in
addition to a remedial or compensatory one.211 Yet, since statutory
damages were intended as replacements for actual damages, they continued
to serve their core compensatory purpose while accommodating a punitive
one. In effect, the compensatory and punitive or deterrent dimensions came
to be merged in practice, especially toward the higher end of the permitted
range, that is, for willful infringements.212
Much like antitrust law’s treble damages rule, copyright law’s
statutory damages provision blends compensatory and punitive purposes
into a single award. Especially since an election for such damages forms an
alternative to actual damages or lost profits, the compensatory dimension of
making the plaintiff whole in situations of injury continues to form at least
part of the rationale for the provision. Given this reality, courts ought to
scrutinize the election for statutory damages more closely, so as to ensure
that the compensatory purpose is not lost altogether. Indeed, this is the
modest lesson that can be taken away from Brunswick.
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 399 (1940) (finding that
statutory damages could not be awarded when damages and profits had been proven); Ziegelheim v.
Flohr, 119 F. Supp. 324, 329 (E.D.N.Y. 1954) (finding that actual damages were easy to calculate and
were “reasonable and just”).
210. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C.).
211. See, e.g., On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 172 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The purpose of punitive
damages—to punish and prevent malicious conduct—is generally achieved under the Copyright Act
through the provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).”); NFL v. PrimeTime 24 Joint Venture, 131 F. Supp.
2d 458, 478 n.17 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (noting that statutory damages can be partially punitive); U.S. Media
Corp. v. Edde Entm’t Corp., No. 94 Civ. 4849 (MBM) (MHD), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10985, at *60
(S.D.N.Y. July 17, 1998) (“[A statutory] award is designed to serve both compensatory and punitive
purposes.”); Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 54, at 460 n.89 (citing several other examples where
courts have recognized this dual purpose).
212. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 54, at 460–61 (explaining that courts’ application of the
1976 Act “has devolved into a regime in which . . . willful infringement is commonly found in cases
when infringement should properly be deemed ordinary”).
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Section 504(a) of the copyright statute allows a plaintiff in an
infringement suit to elect to receive statutory damages in lieu of actual
damages or lost profits at any time before the final judgment is
delivered.213 In its compensatory dimension, the provision operates in
largely evidentiary terms—either allowing the plaintiff to prove actual
damages (and lost profits) or to avoid this burden by settling for an amount
within a specified range. To ensure that the compensatory dimension is
indeed at play—which Congress never sought to eliminate—courts should
scrutinize a plaintiff’s election more closely to ensure the existence of
actual damages or “any additional profits of the infringer” so as to trigger
the very need for damages. In other words, since the statutory damages
provision was intended to aid courts in their computation for compensatory
damages, courts ought to satisfy themselves as to the need for such
damages before proceeding to its computation within the prescribed range.
In situations where the court finds no basis for compensation (no actual
damage suffered), the need to invoke a computational aid ought to
disappear, since the primary logic for damages as a category disappears and
punitive damages are by and large impermissible without compensatory
damages.214
Indeed, the idea of scrutinizing the basis of and need for the plaintiff’s
election has been suggested before. In arguing for reforming copyright
law’s statutory damages provision, Pamela Samuelson and Tara Wheatland
exhort courts to “[a]sk the parties to offer proof of damages and profits, or,
in the alternative, to demonstrate why damages or profits are sufficiently
difficult to prove.”215 They continue on to note that Congress consciously
chose to avoid requiring plaintiffs to offer such proof but seems to have
contemplated an award of no more than the statutory minimum when the
plaintiff fails to offer such proof of actual damages. 216 Accordingly, they
would have courts award the prescribed minimum statutory damages when
the plaintiff has lost no profits or suffered no actual damage.217 The
213. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2006).
214. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 435 (2001) (explaining
that in determining whether punitive damages are appropriate, courts should forgo mathematical
calculations and instead examine (1) the degree of “reprehensibility or culpability,” (2) calculate “the
relationship between the penalty and the harm to the victim,” and (3) compare the sanctions imposed in
similar cases); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575–83 (1996) (same). But see Abner v.
Kan. City S. R.R., 513 F.3d 154, 160 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding that punitive damages could be awarded
without compensatory damages under the Civil Rights Act because of an explicit provision in the Act
that enabled such awards).
215. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 54, at 502.
216. Id. at 502 n.313.
217. Id. at 501.
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Samuelson-Wheatland proposal, while aimed at ensuring greater scrutiny
of a plaintiff’s election, does not quite convert the scrutiny into an actual
prerequisite for recovery.
Interposing Justice Marshall’s logic from Brunswick into this
framework however moves us in the direction of a formal rule of standing.
As noted previously, Brunswick can be seen to stand for the idea that in
dealing with a mixed damages provision in a statute (that is, where both
compensatory and punitive purposes are blended), the court should ensure
that the compensatory purpose is being directly served—in a manner
intended by the statutory framework—before allowing the award. In the
copyright context, this should mean that when a court has reason to suspect
that a plaintiff’s election for statutory damages is not as a computational
aid, but is instead a cloak for some recovery, it should deny the election of
the statutory damages. Instead, the court should tie the recovery to any
actual damages sustained, without which, the plaintiff should be unable to
recover. In effect, this would work as an injury requirement for plaintiffs
seeking to invoke the statutory damages remedy. At the same time, for
plaintiffs that are initial owners of the copyright—such as
authors / creators—this rule of standing might be relaxed for two
interconnected reasons.
First, given copyright’s purpose of creating an ex ante incentive to
create original works of authorship, the very act of infringement—once
identified—can be seen to operate as a valid basis for presuming potential
market harm.218 Since the insistence on a plaintiff’s proving actual
damages is meant to work as a proxy for injury, it ceases to remain
necessary when such injury is known to exist in certain domains. Put in
opposite terms, one could argue that the very availability of statutory
damages operates as an ex ante incentive to create for authors, which in
turn ought not to be disturbed.219 Second, going back to the connection
between the incentive to create and the incentive to enforce, requiring a
218. Indeed, the absence of market harm is often dispositive in fair use cases. Consequently, if a
court were to find a defendant’s copying to be infringement—and not fair use—it is reasonable to infer
the existence of potential market harm. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 566–67 (1985) (explaining that because infringement cases will rarely present clear evidence of
actual damage, “once a copyright holder establishes with reasonable probability the existence of a
causal connection between the infringement and a loss of revenue, the burden properly shifts to the
infringer to show that this damage would have occurred”).
219. Indeed this point is consistent with the Court’s expansive interpretation of copyright law’s
structure as an incentive to create. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 206 (2003) (upholding the
constitutionality of the CTEA and arguing that Congress may have passed the CTEA in order to
“provide greater incentive for American and other authors to create and disseminate their work”).
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plaintiff to adduce evidence of actual harm as a precondition for recovery
would undoubtedly raise the costs of litigation (CL). Without a
corresponding rise in benefits, it would undoubtedly modify the incentive
calculus, altering the Type I / Type II claim equilibrium in one domain,
which could in turn produce effects in others. In other words, by pushing
some claims from Type I to Type II—which the rule could result in for
creator-plaintiffs—it might conversely result in moving other types of
claims from Type II to Type I to balance out the effects of the rule.
The rule of standing would thus operate only in relation to elections
made by noninitial copyright owners, a class recognized by the copyright
statute itself.220 Indeed the Copyright Act itself treats authors as a special
class and vests them with additional protection, in the nature of inalienable
termination rights in the interests of fairness.221 There should thus be little
reason in exempting author-plaintiffs from a formal rule of standing when
they invoke the statutory damages provision. In short, the logic of
Brunswick and the purpose behind copyright law’s provision on statutory
damages allow courts to impose on nonauthor plaintiffs in infringement
suits who elect to recover statutory damages, the burden of showing the
existence of some actual damages or lost profits before validating the
election.
This rule raises the obvious next question of precisely what a
nonauthor plaintiff will need to show to establish that some actual damages
are, in principle, recoverable. As Nimmer notes, “Actual damages represent
the extent to which infringement has injured or destroyed the market value
of the copyrighted work at the time of infringement.”222 At its simplest, the
“basic rule for computing injury to the market value of a copyrighted work
arising from infringement is to inquire what revenue would have accrued to
plaintiff but for the infringement” and to place the burden on the plaintiff
“of establishing with reasonable probability the existence of a causal
connection between defendant’s infringement and loss of anticipated
revenue.”223 In situations in which lost revenue is hard to quantify and the
defendant has no attributable profits to speak of, some courts look to the
“value of use” in their assessment, that is, they equate actual injury with the
likely cost of the infringing use to the defendant had permission been
sought.224 Note that for our purposes, the quantification of these harms is
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006).
Id. § 203.
4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 6, § 14.02[A].
Id. § 14.02[A][1].
Id. § 14.02[B].
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irrelevant, since what matters is their very existence, and once shown to
exist, the nonauthor plaintiff may conveniently elect for statutory damages.
Requiring nonauthor plaintiffs to establish some basis for actual
damages before their election is validated would thus operate as a rule of
substantive standing that comports with copyright’s fundamental
institutional purposes. It would operate as the perfect antidote against the
copyright troll, by rendering its business model unviable—an issue to
which we return.
C. DETERRING THE TROLL
A formal rule disallowing a nonauthor plaintiff from electing for
statutory damages (under § 504(c)) without proof of compensable harm
operates as a direct, targeted measure that is likely to impede copyright
trolling. What is crucial to appreciate about this strategy though is that it
operates by affecting the core motivation of the copyright troll, namely its
reliance on copyright’s statutory damages provision. Unlike a formalized
denial of all standing to sue—such as the expanded Silvers rule—the
version offered here does not formally prohibit trolling, but instead deters
it. In other words, it focuses on eliminating the troll’s basic incentive that
drives its business model. Without the automatic availability of statutory
damages, the troll will have absolutely no guarantee of legal recovery.
Since the troll will in most cases be unable to establish any compensable
harm as such, its ability to recover damages will be dramatically impeded.
Knowing this to be the case, trolls are unlikely to pursue defendants that
copyright owners are unlikely to have gone after themselves (for example,
noncommercial defendants or those engaging in purely personal uses),
thereby aligning the ability to obtain statutory damages with copyright’s
basic a priori incentive structure to litigate the claim.
None of this is to suggest that this strategy is foolproof. Copyright
trolls might choose to take their chances and hope that defendants are risk
averse enough to settle even without a valid claim for statutory damages.
While this might have limited payoff in the short run, it is unlikely to be a
viable model once a defendant emerges who is willing to test the troll’s
claim and have it adjudicated in a court.
The situation in which the compensable harm prerequisite is more
likely to be insufficient involves defendants that have an interest in
continuing their use of the work. In other words, when a defendant has
something to lose from being enjoined from copying, a troll could in theory
choose to seek a permanent injunction by way of remedy and use the threat
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of such an injunction to obtain a hefty settlement from the defendant—
which would operate as a licensing fee of sorts.225 This too is unlikely
because the grant of injunctive relief is predicated on a plaintiff being able
to show a likelihood of irreparable injury without such relief.226
The first requirement that courts of equity look to before granting
injunctions is the requirement that the plaintiff establishes that an ordinary
legal remedy—namely compensatory damages—will not adequately repair
the harm. While the rule diminished in significance in the last century, the
last few years have seen its revival following the Supreme Court’s decision
in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., which held that courts have to look
to equity’s traditional requirements, including the irreparable-injury rule,
before granting injunctive relief. 227 While eBay dealt with permanent
injunctions in patent cases, its logic and reasoning apply with equal force to
copyright law and preliminary injunctions as well, and indeed later courts
have extended it in that direction.228 In essence, the irreparable-injury rule
prohibits courts from presuming that an injunction ought to follow merely
because a plaintiff establishes ownership of copyright and an infringement.
It needs to be additionally satisfied that damages are not sufficient.
One of the ways in which courts have historically satisfied the
irreparable injury requirement is when damages are too difficult to measure
accurately.229 Here, however, courts are required to invoke the logic of the
compensable harm requirement suggested for statutory damages.230 Merely
because damages cannot be adequately measured should not imply that
courts do not satisfy themselves of the existence of compensable harm for
such damages to begin with.231 In other words, the gist of eBay is that a
court cannot presume irreparable harm merely because a right is violated,
225. Injunctive relief while codified in Title 17 is largely equitable in its origins and availability.
See 17 U.S.C. § 502(a); Abend v. MCA, Inc., 863 F.2d 1465, 1479 (9th Cir. 1988) (seeking injunctive
relief under § 502(a)).
226. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–93 (2006) (stating in the context of a
patent infringement the four factor test that includes irreparable injury and that “this Court has
consistently rejected invitations to replace traditional equitable considerations with a rule that an
injunction automatically follows a determination that a copyright has been infringed”); Abend, 863 F.2d
at 1479 (denying injunctive relief where the party failed to show irreparable injury).
227. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
228. E.g., Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 77 (2d Cir. 2010) (“We hold today that eBay applies
with equal force (a) to preliminary injunctions (b) that are issued for alleged copyright infringement.”).
229. See id. at 81; Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule, 103 HARV. L.
REV. 687, 711–13 (1990).
230. See 6 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 22:74 (2012).
231. Salinger, 607 F.3d at 82 (“After eBay, however, courts must not simply presume irreparable
harm . . . . Rather, plaintiffs must show that, on the facts of their case, the failure to issue an injunction
would actually cause irreparable harm.”).
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but instead needs to be convinced that such harm does in fact exist or is
very likely.232 Consequently, the copyright troll is unlikely to succeed in
merely replacing its quest for statutory damages with injunctive relief and
going after defendants that intend to continue using the work. Courts are
likely to insist on a showing of actual or potential harm—which the troll is
unlikely to satisfy by merely pointing to presumptively lost licensing
revenue.
V. CONCLUSION
Today, the copyright troll is a common bogeyman used to illustrate
the innumerable problems that underlie our copyright system. In the
process, discussions of copyright trolling all too readily ignore the
mechanisms of copyright law that motivate trolling and the precise reasons
why copyright trolling is fundamentally problematic. This in turn has
courts and scholars developing antidotes to copyright trolling that are
ineffective, short-lived, overexpansive, or which in their myopic focus on
the consequences of trolling, end up foreclosing potentially important
developments in the copyright system.
In this Article, I have argued that copyright trolling remains a deeply
problematic activity, but for reasons that have little to do with fair use or
the acquisition of copyright claims by third parties. Copyright law, as an
inducement for creativity, is premised on the connection between the
incentive to create and the incentive to enforce actionable claims. It
contains an important balance between claims that are enforced and those
that are tolerated despite their being actionable as such. Very importantly,
this balance is realized by the private enforcement decisions of copyright
owners over time. As an entity having no interest in the creation,
distribution, or use of creative works, yet motivated to enforce copyright
claims relating to such works in a dogmatic manner, the copyright troll
disrupts this informal, unwritten, and fragile equilibrium. In the process, it
detaches the enforcement side of copyright from its functioning as an
inducement to create. What makes its actions additionally troublesome is
the fact that in disrupting this informal equilibrium, its actions nonetheless
comply perfectly with all of copyright law’s formal rules. This is precisely
what makes the case against copyright trolls complicated.
Despite having risen to prominence only recently, the conceptual and
analytical tools that make trolling possible have been in existence since the
232.

Id.
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Copyright Act of 1976. The Righthaven episode brought home—to courts,
lawyers, and the public—the speed and effectiveness with which copyright
trolls could operate, and the powerlessness of courts to deal with the
phenomenon. While Righthaven may have ended its operations, it is
certainly only a matter of time before an entity learns from Righthaven’s
mistakes and picks up where it left off. When that occurs, courts and
policymakers will do well to fully appreciate what copyright trolling is and
is not, and why it is that trolling is detrimental to the copyright system,
before formulating a response to it. Failing such an approach, copyright
trolls will have little reason to worry about their future.
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